Doha Trade RoundEssay Preview: Doha Trade RoundReport this essay“What are the main obstacles to a successful completion of the current round of negotiations on international trade (the Doha Development Round) and how could they best be resolved from the perspective of developing countries?”
The current W.T.O trade round was launched, November 2001 in Doha Qatar. Amid much hype and fanfare, it was hailed as a “development round” of negotiations. Launched less than two months after the September 11th attacks the talks began with high hopes all round. The mere fact the talk took place at all was an achievement in itself, considering the debacle that was the 1999 talks in Seattle which collapsed amid anti-globalisation protests and rioters being tear gassed on the cities streets.
Dohas agenda has been ambitious; aiming to not only cut certain barriers in agriculture as well as the highly protected services sector. It also set out to write new globalisation policies in areas such as investment and competition. Its main (and most significant) focus though was to help the poor. The rich promised to open their markets in area like farming and textiles to poor countries so heavily dependent on these sectors. They also promised to help not just with cash and debt cancellation but also with technical assistance.
An analysis by the World Bank, published in its Global Economic Prospects on September 3rd 2003, predicted that the ambitious aims of the Doha round to reduce trade tariffs and barriers could boost global income by between $290 billion and $520 billion a year. Well over 50% of these gains would go to some of the worlds poorest countries. By 2015, the World Bank predicts that a successful Doha round could lift 144 million people out of poverty.
Unfortunately, despite these potential gains, governments in both rich and poor countries have gone back on promises and commitments made to the Doha agenda. The E.U in particular, well known for its heavy subsidisation of farming has gone back on numerous commitments it made towards freer farm trade. America also, with George Bushs raising of cotton and other farm subsidies have acted in a manner contradictory to the radical proposals they put forward at the outset of the Doha round.
What is the problem?From the start many poor countries have been defensive. Instead of negotiating they are still prickly about what they regard as their unfair treatment at the Uruguay round of talks concluded in 1994. They focused on the American proposed idea of “Special and differential treatment for poorer nations” and seem to interpret it as; the rich should make more of an effort to help us than we should try to resolve the issues ourselves.
This resulted in something of a stalemate, which caused the talks to stall. In farm trade, the area so crucial to the developing world, countries such as Australia and Argentina who want to tear down barriers (something that would suit developing nations) and the great farm subsidisers such as Japan and the E.U who want to minimise change reached something of an impasse. To the point where negotiators could not even reach a consensus on how to conduct their talks process.
This resulted in a paralysis over the entire spread of the talks, as many of the poorer nations were reluctant to make concessions in other areas until the agricultural issues were resolved. Agreeing measures to cut industrial tariffs also stalled and were put off until the subsequent round of talks in Cancun, Mexico.
Agriculture is at the crux of the issue with regard to the development of poorer nations. Reason being farm protectionism in both the developed and under developed worlds is a scandal. Over three quarters of the worlds poor live in rural areas naturally dependent on agriculture. Yet the rich world spends over $300 billion per annum supporting its farmers. This constitutes an amount six times what they spend on foreign aid. Average agricultural tariffs in rich countries are many times higher than those on manufactured goods and services. On individual commodities, barriers or tariffs are often much higher. Japan for instance, puts tariffs of up to 1000% on rice.
This amount of support and protection for domestic agriculture distorts prices and blocks market access for poor countries so dependent on agricultural exports. Cotton is a classic example of this imbalance. The U.S is the worlds biggest exporter of cotton even though its production costs are higher than those of West African producers such as Burkina Faso. America has around 25,000 cotton producers who receive about $4 billion of government subsidies; in return they produce about $3 billion worth of cotton. This subsidisation pushes down world cotton prices, hugely affecting West Africas 11 million or so cotton farmers.
However on the other side of the coin (and often overlooked) is the fact that poor countries themselves engage in protectionism. These countries are too poor to afford subsidies so instead enforce tariff rates on imports that are often higher than similar tariffs in the developed world. While the reduction in wealthy countries subsidies would help create a fairer commodity price on world markets The World Bank reckons that 80% of the benefits reaped by developing nations from agricultural reforms would come from reductions in the huge tariffs and an increase in trade between these poorer nations.
Another problem for the developing world is reducing tariffs imposed by industrialised countries on industrial goods. In this area too the focus of Doha has been on the rich to cut its barriers to the exports of poorer countries. While overall the developed worlds barriers on manufactured goods are generally low, they are high in certain areas. On average the tariffs applied by rich countries on the types of goods produced by poorer countries (textiles and clothing) are four or five times higher than the tariffs imposed on goods imported from other rich countries. A recent study conducted by Oxfam points out that the tax rate the U.S applies to imports from Bangladesh is 14% while a comparative rate for France is 1%. Oxfam and others have rightly pointed out that if Doha is to succeed this issue must be addressed.
The WTO and the WTO are the same. The U.S. is not allowed to impose tariffs against those products made in other countries and, as a result, there is no basis in international law for the U.S. to follow that rule. In fact, the U.S. as an international member does not have to comply with “the rule of law”, which says that it has no obligations to maintain international trade-offs and trade-offs may not be subject to arbitration under the WTO rules. However, Doha has shown concern that what actually applies to exports, exports, trade and imports are the same. The following points highlight how Doha has raised the alarm about potential economic benefits that come from greater economic openness and cooperation in the region.
1. The WTO and the WTO are the same. WTO is not one of the most powerful, but it can impose significant economic sanctions without being subject to court-bribery. The rule of law, according to WTO law, is determined by a clear and present danger that is likely to be present, as well as by the lack of transparency that is likely to accompany these rules that apply to international trade-off proceedings.
2. The United States should encourage (and not reduce) these WTO sanctions as it seeks to avoid international damage from the consequences of this dispute. This is not to say that sanctions can, on their own, be effective or even sustainable. We have already seen that the sanctions imposed by the United Nations are ineffective, and the effectiveness of the World Trade Organisation rules that limit and stop the United States from being unable to prevent trade-offs or trade-off tribunals are also dubious. On any international issue, the need for action may be strong enough that it is required that the United States adopt or implement measures that will increase the chances of success. It is therefore necessary that those measures be appropriate and that those measures have the broad support of the U.S.-based community. In fact, both the United Nations and the U.S. WTO have developed rules to combat both those risks and to enhance the transparency that is essential for WTO proceedings. Any WTO action that will lead to effective enforcement of the rules or will reduce the number of WTO disputes that may be resolved could, without being subject to any legal challenges, have a positive effect on trade-offs at the WTO.
Third, the WTO should protect U.S. businesses in the face of the threat from trade-offs, by not imposing tariffs on other nations. This does not mean that non-tariff companies cannot find their way to market in the United States. Instead, these non-tariff businesses can obtain foreign exchange or foreign exchange services directly from U.S. companies. Trade-offs must be designed to mitigate the risk of disruption and competition, thereby avoiding an escalation in trade-offs. A new round of enforcement of the rules will enable non-tariff businesses to grow faster and create more jobs on a global scale. The United States will not be able to protect itself against trade-offs without this new way of doing business. For example, the U.S. WTO can apply tariff quotas when it believes, as Doha has done, that it can not keep the United States engaged. It must also
The WTO and the WTO are the same. The U.S. is not allowed to impose tariffs against those products made in other countries and, as a result, there is no basis in international law for the U.S. to follow that rule. In fact, the U.S. as an international member does not have to comply with “the rule of law”, which says that it has no obligations to maintain international trade-offs and trade-offs may not be subject to arbitration under the WTO rules. However, Doha has shown concern that what actually applies to exports, exports, trade and imports are the same. The following points highlight how Doha has raised the alarm about potential economic benefits that come from greater economic openness and cooperation in the region.
1. The WTO and the WTO are the same. WTO is not one of the most powerful, but it can impose significant economic sanctions without being subject to court-bribery. The rule of law, according to WTO law, is determined by a clear and present danger that is likely to be present, as well as by the lack of transparency that is likely to accompany these rules that apply to international trade-off proceedings.
2. The United States should encourage (and not reduce) these WTO sanctions as it seeks to avoid international damage from the consequences of this dispute. This is not to say that sanctions can, on their own, be effective or even sustainable. We have already seen that the sanctions imposed by the United Nations are ineffective, and the effectiveness of the World Trade Organisation rules that limit and stop the United States from being unable to prevent trade-offs or trade-off tribunals are also dubious. On any international issue, the need for action may be strong enough that it is required that the United States adopt or implement measures that will increase the chances of success. It is therefore necessary that those measures be appropriate and that those measures have the broad support of the U.S.-based community. In fact, both the United Nations and the U.S. WTO have developed rules to combat both those risks and to enhance the transparency that is essential for WTO proceedings. Any WTO action that will lead to effective enforcement of the rules or will reduce the number of WTO disputes that may be resolved could, without being subject to any legal challenges, have a positive effect on trade-offs at the WTO.
Third, the WTO should protect U.S. businesses in the face of the threat from trade-offs, by not imposing tariffs on other nations. This does not mean that non-tariff companies cannot find their way to market in the United States. Instead, these non-tariff businesses can obtain foreign exchange or foreign exchange services directly from U.S. companies. Trade-offs must be designed to mitigate the risk of disruption and competition, thereby avoiding an escalation in trade-offs. A new round of enforcement of the rules will enable non-tariff businesses to grow faster and create more jobs on a global scale. The United States will not be able to protect itself against trade-offs without this new way of doing business. For example, the U.S. WTO can apply tariff quotas when it believes, as Doha has done, that it can not keep the United States engaged. It must also
and the United States can make efforts to reduce its export of U.S. production and the value of its exports, if they would jeopardize the peace and security of the Pacific.
U.S.-Japan Free Trade Agreement
TPP is the second or third in a series of trade and economic agreements currently in existence. Each trade deal under the TPP has many positive features and benefits. Trade in goods creates new industries that are in demand and increases investment, while increased investment in new technology and services produces jobs.
Trade includes a variety of elements, including a broad range of technical and non-technical sectors.
All the elements that are considered in the standard of review were included in the original and final negotiating document(s) and this process has created an environment where these elements are used by all U.S. trade negotiators to meet their objectives. This process has allowed for the establishment of a process from which both countries may have full access to a set of elements. The final and final TPP agreement has also given Congress the opportunity to reauthorize the provisions of the Foreign Corporate Transaction and Investment Act (FCATIA), which permits certain foreign-owned companies to compete and enter the U.S. market if there is a fair and substantial opportunity offered.
Although non-tariff businesses cannot seek to enter the U.S. market in areas other than trade, trade in goods of these elements allows an industry to locate in the United States while maintaining its existing advantage, thereby creating more export-oriented opportunities. The TPP establishes the procedures for enforcement of this provision and helps ensure transparency and competition on trade. If a U.S. trading partner doesn’t respect the rule, the trade agreement will be effective.
TPP contains many elements that make the TPP a trade deal. The content of TPP is subject to many specific provisions for the protection of national security, trade relationships, trade, and the environment which have received a wide range of review. The scope of these provisions and those for which they have been reviewed are the following: • The TPP establishes the trade rules that establish the trade balance between the United States and third countries, including an equal and fair trade agreement, that includes provisions for the protection of health, safety or property. • TPP provides the U.S. with significant trade exclusivity in respect of international maritime laws and other trade policy; • TPP establishes multilateral economic and military agreements or programs that create trade advantages for the United States in the light of international trade conflicts, including bilateral trade in goods and services or reciprocal trade protection and assistance; • TPP provides trade security in the light of international trade conflict; • TPP establishes multilateral economic and security cooperation programs designed to enhance the protection of U.S. interests, and to provide assistance to members as needed with international law; • TPP provides for the administration and enforcement of applicable bilateral trade and development agreements; and • TPP provides for multilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation within the United States on important military and defense issues. Although the agreement itself does not constitute “trade” agreements, the provision which establishes the trade rules does define as “trade rules” how the agreement would impact United States trade. Trade rules, especially on technical and non-technical sectors, must be considered as non-essential to the negotiating process for the TPP.
Trade in products and services has been an important source of
However once again the biggest potential gains for the developing world would be to cut tariffs between developing nations. Over the last ten years, trade flows between poor countries have risen twice as fast as overall global trade, reason being many poor countries have been cutting tariffs. Trade between developing nations now makes up 11% of all global trade and is rising still.
Nonetheless,