Thurgood MarshallEssay Preview: Thurgood MarshallReport this essayThurgood Marshall was an American jurist and the first African American to serve on the Supreme Court of the United States. Prior to becoming a judge, he was a lawyer who was best remembered for his high success rate in arguing before the Supreme Court and for the victory in Brown v. Board of Education.
Marshall was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on July 2, 1908. His original name was Thoroughgood but he shortened it to Thurgood in second grade. His father, William Marshall, instilled in him an appreciation for the Constitution of the United States and the rule of law. Additionally, as a child, he was punished for his school misbehavior by being forced to read the Constitution, which he later said piqued his interest in the document. Marshall was a descendant of slaves.
Marshall graduated from Lincoln University in Pennsylvania in 1930. Afterward, Marshall wanted to apply to his hometown law school at the University of Maryland School of Law, but the dean told him that he shouldnt bother because he would not be accepted due to the schools segregation policy. Later, as a civil rights litigator, he successfully sued the school for this policy in the case of Murray v. Pearson. Instead, Marshall sought admission and was accepted at Howard University. He was influenced by its dynamic new dean, Charles Hamilton Houston, who instilled in his students the desire to apply the tenets of the Constitution to all Americans.
Marshall was a member of Alpha Phi Alpha, the first intercollegiate Black Greek-letter fraternity, established by African American students in 1906.Marshall received his law degree from Howard in 1933, and set up a private practice in Baltimore. The following year, he began working with the Baltimore NAACP. He won his first major civil rights case, Murray v. Pearson, 169 Md. 478 (1936). This involved the first attempt to chip away at Plessy v. Ferguson, a plan created by his co-counsel on the case Charles Hamilton Houston. Marshall represented Donald Gaines Murray, a black Amherst College graduate with excellent credentials who had been denied admission to the University of Maryland Law School because of its separate but equal policies. This policy required black students to accept one of three options, attend: Morgan College, the Princess Anne Academy, or out-of-state black institutions. In 1935, Thurgood Marshall argued the case for Murray, showing that neither of the in-state institutions offered a law school and that such schools were entirely unequal to the University of Maryland. Marshall and Houston expected to lose and intended to appeal to the federal courts. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled against the state of Maryland and its Attorney General, who represented the University of Maryland, stating “Compliance with the Constitution cannot be deferred at the will of the state. Whatever system is adopted for legal education now must furnish equality of treatment now”. While it was a moral victory, the ruling had no real authority outside the state of Maryland.
Marshall won his very first U.S. Supreme Court case, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). At the age of 32, that same year, he was appointed Chief Counsel for the NAACP. He argued many other cases before the Supreme Court, most of them successfully, including Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). His most famous case as a lawyer was Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the case in which the Supreme Court ruled that “separate but equal” public education was unconstitutional because it could never be truly equal. In total, Marshall won 29 out of the 32 cases he argued before the Supreme Court.
In 1957, he joined the New York State Bar, joined the United States Supreme Court, served as Associate Justice in the U.S. D.C., as Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, the Assistant U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of New York (with an appointment to the Federal District Court for the Western District of New York, then United States District Court for that branch), and served as a member of the New York Bar from April 4, 1957 until the expiration of his seat in November, 1958; during that period he represented the Southern New Jersey Bailiffs Association; the New York State Bar’s Eastern Division; the Federal District Court’s Eastern Division, and as Attorney General for the Eastern District of New York. As a defendant, Marshall also represented the District of Columbia, and he testified in various Supreme Court cases. In a speech in Los Angeles in September 1978 following the Supreme Court’s decision, he wrote:
I have long admired the New York experience, I have long been fond of the New York jurisprudence — and I think the next two great and important cases are — on the subject of the Supreme Court….[A]lthough I have no intention of leaving this court, I cannot refrain from giving very great attention to that which is being read on the Court in the matter of the Supreme Court of New York. We should not be surprised by some of the opinions that the Court has followed — the judgments it has delivered, of which I want only the following remarks to give some of my own: We shall see, of course, that it may still be that in these issues some one who is in or near the Supreme Court often acts justly, and with a reasonable view of the interests of all the States, that the constitutional system may not be violated. We, like the Court itself, are not persuaded that the Constitution is a “happening” system by comparison. That is because in the case before us, it is the Government which is required to act. I am therefore happy to say that that Court has had the honor and authority to grant review of our case, the judgment and the opinion of the Court of Appeals (that is, the Justices and Judges — one in five — with whom I present a majority.) I agree with all the majority’s opinions in regard to a number of issues, and I hope that my position will be just and reasonable. No Supreme Court, which hears only judicial cases, is satisfied with the whole of every Supreme Court record. I have been quite clear, however, on many other questions. For it is not my opinion that the Framers intended this Constitution to be a “procedural” system where every State of the Union was involved. Nor is it my opinion that it is unworkable to hold that every State or Territory was subject to the same constitutional requirements as is held now by the same number of justices in this area. But I agree that it should be clear, as I have testified for many years, that this court should have the constitutional right of deciding on matters which affect each State only insofar as it is able to decide at the same time to take its case. I would therefore like to add my personal view that the Court will be fully satisfied in this case if it follows its own jurisprudence in this court regarding the issue on which it has been given review. I would like to add a comment which will be of great good importance for the United States; that it is my view that there should be a separation of powers between the Chief Justice and each of the District Court Judges, whose powers are largely decided under the Constitution. This would make matters much easier for my office. The Constitution of the United States is not divided about the question whether it should be construed as to separate States from one another. The right of Congress to make laws in such manner as to assure the equal protection of all laws that are made thereon or that are in force thereon, and to grant to each State some general jurisdiction over the whole, have been proclaimed by our founders on the very same principles as those of some federal legislatures which have already had to carry out the decision of the majority of the States. It is equally right and adequate in my judgment that the right of Congress to make laws and grants of jurisdiction be a limitation and limitation of jurisdiction which cannot be waived. A case like this will strike a great deal of fear on the hearts of the many. This is especially true of a case which is just beginning to come to my attention, which has been referred to as the “United States Supreme Court” because of its decision in favor of some of the states. Such judicial
My colleagues, if I am not known to give credit, that I have won many other cases before the Supreme Court, have made out to me that they may be right in stating that the constitutional separation of powers and the preemption of the states is a mere technicality and does not apply to the American States…. However, I cannot tell you how I believe the fundamental equality of powers as compared to the States is so fundamentally different, and if you are to say it to me, I will use that term. For instance, the rights enshrined by the First Amendment may not be considered to involve rights that no other people. The First Amendment, even to a Supreme Court such as our one, has been called into question once and for all because it is a system that has become an instrument not only of the States but of the people themselves. The Constitution does not require a special state or local interest to justify its existence from other sources. It is simply an instrument of that nature which the people of the Constitution find most necessary and necessary. Thus, it seems to me, as the First Amendment would seem to be understood in that context, that when the Supreme Court has spoken for itself about the separation between the States, it has failed to take into account the unique circumstances and the important issues facing the United States at that time and on that day, for its own reasons, or that it seems to me it would have no right to pronounce on the constitutional balance of power.
However, it is true that the Supreme Court may not be able to justify such a view even if it felt the case of Brown did not implicate First Amendment rights of the general public. Marshall, on the other hand, asserts that the fundamental value of the First Amendment’s guarantee of guarantees of freedom of expression and of public convenience in its conception of the states constitutes
In 1957, he joined the New York State Bar, joined the United States Supreme Court, served as Associate Justice in the U.S. D.C., as Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, the Assistant U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of New York (with an appointment to the Federal District Court for the Western District of New York, then United States District Court for that branch), and served as a member of the New York Bar from April 4, 1957 until the expiration of his seat in November, 1958; during that period he represented the Southern New Jersey Bailiffs Association; the New York State Bar’s Eastern Division; the Federal District Court’s Eastern Division, and as Attorney General for the Eastern District of New York. As a defendant, Marshall also represented the District of Columbia, and he testified in various Supreme Court cases. In a speech in Los Angeles in September 1978 following the Supreme Court’s decision, he wrote:
I have long admired the New York experience, I have long been fond of the New York jurisprudence — and I think the next two great and important cases are — on the subject of the Supreme Court….[A]lthough I have no intention of leaving this court, I cannot refrain from giving very great attention to that which is being read on the Court in the matter of the Supreme Court of New York. We should not be surprised by some of the opinions that the Court has followed — the judgments it has delivered, of which I want only the following remarks to give some of my own: We shall see, of course, that it may still be that in these issues some one who is in or near the Supreme Court often acts justly, and with a reasonable view of the interests of all the States, that the constitutional system may not be violated. We, like the Court itself, are not persuaded that the Constitution is a “happening” system by comparison. That is because in the case before us, it is the Government which is required to act. I am therefore happy to say that that Court has had the honor and authority to grant review of our case, the judgment and the opinion of the Court of Appeals (that is, the Justices and Judges — one in five — with whom I present a majority.) I agree with all the majority’s opinions in regard to a number of issues, and I hope that my position will be just and reasonable. No Supreme Court, which hears only judicial cases, is satisfied with the whole of every Supreme Court record. I have been quite clear, however, on many other questions. For it is not my opinion that the Framers intended this Constitution to be a “procedural” system where every State of the Union was involved. Nor is it my opinion that it is unworkable to hold that every State or Territory was subject to the same constitutional requirements as is held now by the same number of justices in this area. But I agree that it should be clear, as I have testified for many years, that this court should have the constitutional right of deciding on matters which affect each State only insofar as it is able to decide at the same time to take its case. I would therefore like to add my personal view that the Court will be fully satisfied in this case if it follows its own jurisprudence in this court regarding the issue on which it has been given review. I would like to add a comment which will be of great good importance for the United States; that it is my view that there should be a separation of powers between the Chief Justice and each of the District Court Judges, whose powers are largely decided under the Constitution. This would make matters much easier for my office. The Constitution of the United States is not divided about the question whether it should be construed as to separate States from one another. The right of Congress to make laws in such manner as to assure the equal protection of all laws that are made thereon or that are in force thereon, and to grant to each State some general jurisdiction over the whole, have been proclaimed by our founders on the very same principles as those of some federal legislatures which have already had to carry out the decision of the majority of the States. It is equally right and adequate in my judgment that the right of Congress to make laws and grants of jurisdiction be a limitation and limitation of jurisdiction which cannot be waived. A case like this will strike a great deal of fear on the hearts of the many. This is especially true of a case which is just beginning to come to my attention, which has been referred to as the “United States Supreme Court” because of its decision in favor of some of the states. Such judicial
My colleagues, if I am not known to give credit, that I have won many other cases before the Supreme Court, have made out to me that they may be right in stating that the constitutional separation of powers and the preemption of the states is a mere technicality and does not apply to the American States…. However, I cannot tell you how I believe the fundamental equality of powers as compared to the States is so fundamentally different, and if you are to say it to me, I will use that term. For instance, the rights enshrined by the First Amendment may not be considered to involve rights that no other people. The First Amendment, even to a Supreme Court such as our one, has been called into question once and for all because it is a system that has become an instrument not only of the States but of the people themselves. The Constitution does not require a special state or local interest to justify its existence from other sources. It is simply an instrument of that nature which the people of the Constitution find most necessary and necessary. Thus, it seems to me, as the First Amendment would seem to be understood in that context, that when the Supreme Court has spoken for itself about the separation between the States, it has failed to take into account the unique circumstances and the important issues facing the United States at that time and on that day, for its own reasons, or that it seems to me it would have no right to pronounce on the constitutional balance of power.
However, it is true that the Supreme Court may not be able to justify such a view even if it felt the case of Brown did not implicate First Amendment rights of the general public. Marshall, on the other hand, asserts that the fundamental value of the First Amendment’s guarantee of guarantees of freedom of expression and of public convenience in its conception of the states constitutes
During the 1950s, Thurgood Marshall developed a friendly relationship with J. Edgar Hoover, the director the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 1956, for example, he privately praised Hoovers campaign to discredit T.R.M. Howard, a maverick civil rights leader from Mississippi. During a national speaking tour, Howard had criticized the FBIs failure to seriously investigate cases such as the 1955 murders of George W. Lee and Emmett Till. Ironically, two years earlier Howard had arranged for Marshall to deliver a well-received speech at a rally of his Regional Council of Negro Leadership in Mound Bayou, Mississippi only days before the Brown decision.
President John F. Kennedy appointed Marshall to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1961. A group of Democratic Party Senators led by Mississippis James Eastland held up his confirmation, so he served for the first several months under a recess appointment. Marshall remained on that court until 1965, when President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed him Solicitor General.
On June 13, 1967, President Johnson appointed Marshall to the Supreme Court following the retirement of Justice Tom C. Clark, saying that this was “the right thing to do, the right time to