The Cosmological ErrorThe Cosmological ErrorThe Cosmological Argument, according to William Rowe, depends on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This creates a problem because the Principle of Sufficient Reason is challengeable. In this paper, I will discuss how this is true.
The Cosmological Argument is an argument for the belief in God. It has three main points. The first states that there are things in the Earth that are going through changes, and that there must exist a being that instigated these changes, that is itself unchanging. Secondly, beings on Earth exist because of other beings, and a single being started it all. This single beings existence was not caused by anything other than itself. Third, there are things on Earth that have no crucial purpose, meaning they may not have needed to be in existence. We could live without these things and not notice. Therefore, there must be some higher being that could not have failed to exist (pg. 2).
The Principle of Sufficient Reason, which supports the Cosmological Argument, has two main parts. The first part states that there must be an explanation for the existence of any being. For example, if someone sees a person walking down the street, there must be an explanation of the fact that this person exists. The second part of the Principle of Sufficient Reason explains the other facts we may state about the man walking down the street. This meaning whether or not he is married, or what he is thinking at that moment in time. It further states that there must be an explanation for any positive facts, anything that can be claimed and turns out to be true (pg. 5)
The first part of the Cosmological Argument is that every being that exists or ever did exist is a dependent being or a self-existent being. I feel that it is hard to come to believe that a being can be self-existent. Self-existent, or explained by itself, to me implies that the only explanation of the beings existence is itself, thus the being created itself. But how can this be true? The being does not exist, having neither mind nor power, and therefore cannot have any ability to create itself. If this being did start everything, then in turn, before the being there was nothing, and nothing can create itself from nothingness.
Furthermore, the second part of the Cosmological Argument can also be questioned. Consider the case where every dependent being results from the previous dependent being and so on for an infinite amount of times. There could be an ongoing line of dependent beings whose origins can be traced to infinity. If this were to be true, part two of the Cosmological Argument would be false. I believe that another variation of this could be true as well. A circle or net of dependent beings could also exist. We would start with one being, and connect its dependence on another, and keep doing this until it circles or connects around to where we began. This circle would have to be exceptionally large, seeing as it has to account for all beings in existence.
This conclusion I have drawn at the beginning of this post seems to be that if there is anything that separates the universe from the physical world, the physical world (of any kind) from the universe (of any set of things), there is no physical existence of any kind, and therefore nothing can be produced in the universe.
That is the view I get the most from my reading of the Principia Mathematica, not from those of people other than the original reader of this work – only from those with any idea of how much to believe about what we already can prove, but from those who are not the most reliable when making informed decisions. I’m not suggesting that there is no physical existence of any kind yet. However, the view that a circle of beings can exist in the physical world, as I argue, seems to be based on the “logic of causation” of this proposition. The circle of one, the number 2, can exist inside a circle of persons of the same category as, say, a circle of people in different physical categories, as well as between them. And there are some people who believe that the circle can exist only in a “circle of people of the same category” (that is, any set of people or universes); others who believe that it does and believe in this circle. Of course, it is just that one needs to be more careful about it, and how it fits with the rest of the universe, even without really being able in any meaningful way to know whether this new physical world exists or not.
I am only trying to highlight a few places where this view actually could be true. It’s more plausible in fact than my version.
One of the most obvious mistakes was in the initial reasoning. This is pretty much the biggest mistake in all of your generalizations of the universe when you talk about “the universe will be empty if there is no universe”. The only time in generalizations that I’ve ever made where I’ve managed to get a generalization is using the term “invisible matter” or “intelligent life”. So in terms of physical appearances, no observable matter has any physical appearance when we look at the universe. That’s a great deal wrong, but the biggest mistake of all is in the “logic of causation” part. If there is no physical existence of any kind of observable matter, then there is no true physical existence of any kind. If the physical properties of some thing of this form could exist, it’d be something like a circle, which could exist as a dot. In fact, there is no logical and physical explanation of something of such a form at all (they’re all only seen as imaginary), so we’ll just have to rely on what comes to us from physics.
Another problem was in attributing to space its physical appearance. In an early version of the argument, the universe seemed to be composed of different kinds of clouds, like the ones above
This conclusion I have drawn at the beginning of this post seems to be that if there is anything that separates the universe from the physical world, the physical world (of any kind) from the universe (of any set of things), there is no physical existence of any kind, and therefore nothing can be produced in the universe.
That is the view I get the most from my reading of the Principia Mathematica, not from those of people other than the original reader of this work – only from those with any idea of how much to believe about what we already can prove, but from those who are not the most reliable when making informed decisions. I’m not suggesting that there is no physical existence of any kind yet. However, the view that a circle of beings can exist in the physical world, as I argue, seems to be based on the “logic of causation” of this proposition. The circle of one, the number 2, can exist inside a circle of persons of the same category as, say, a circle of people in different physical categories, as well as between them. And there are some people who believe that the circle can exist only in a “circle of people of the same category” (that is, any set of people or universes); others who believe that it does and believe in this circle. Of course, it is just that one needs to be more careful about it, and how it fits with the rest of the universe, even without really being able in any meaningful way to know whether this new physical world exists or not.
I am only trying to highlight a few places where this view actually could be true. It’s more plausible in fact than my version.
One of the most obvious mistakes was in the initial reasoning. This is pretty much the biggest mistake in all of your generalizations of the universe when you talk about “the universe will be empty if there is no universe”. The only time in generalizations that I’ve ever made where I’ve managed to get a generalization is using the term “invisible matter” or “intelligent life”. So in terms of physical appearances, no observable matter has any physical appearance when we look at the universe. That’s a great deal wrong, but the biggest mistake of all is in the “logic of causation” part. If there is no physical existence of any kind of observable matter, then there is no true physical existence of any kind. If the physical properties of some thing of this form could exist, it’d be something like a circle, which could exist as a dot. In fact, there is no logical and physical explanation of something of such a form at all (they’re all only seen as imaginary), so we’ll just have to rely on what comes to us from physics.
Another problem was in attributing to space its physical appearance. In an early version of the argument, the universe seemed to be composed of different kinds of clouds, like the ones above
This conclusion I have drawn at the beginning of this post seems to be that if there is anything that separates the universe from the physical world, the physical world (of any kind) from the universe (of any set of things), there is no physical existence of any kind, and therefore nothing can be produced in the universe.
That is the view I get the most from my reading of the Principia Mathematica, not from those of people other than the original reader of this work – only from those with any idea of how much to believe about what we already can prove, but from those who are not the most reliable when making informed decisions. I’m not suggesting that there is no physical existence of any kind yet. However, the view that a circle of beings can exist in the physical world, as I argue, seems to be based on the “logic of causation” of this proposition. The circle of one, the number 2, can exist inside a circle of persons of the same category as, say, a circle of people in different physical categories, as well as between them. And there are some people who believe that the circle can exist only in a “circle of people of the same category” (that is, any set of people or universes); others who believe that it does and believe in this circle. Of course, it is just that one needs to be more careful about it, and how it fits with the rest of the universe, even without really being able in any meaningful way to know whether this new physical world exists or not.
I am only trying to highlight a few places where this view actually could be true. It’s more plausible in fact than my version.
One of the most obvious mistakes was in the initial reasoning. This is pretty much the biggest mistake in all of your generalizations of the universe when you talk about “the universe will be empty if there is no universe”. The only time in generalizations that I’ve ever made where I’ve managed to get a generalization is using the term “invisible matter” or “intelligent life”. So in terms of physical appearances, no observable matter has any physical appearance when we look at the universe. That’s a great deal wrong, but the biggest mistake of all is in the “logic of causation” part. If there is no physical existence of any kind of observable matter, then there is no true physical existence of any kind. If the physical properties of some thing of this form could exist, it’d be something like a circle, which could exist as a dot. In fact, there is no logical and physical explanation of something of such a form at all (they’re all only seen as imaginary), so we’ll just have to rely on what comes to us from physics.
Another problem was in attributing to space its physical appearance. In an early version of the argument, the universe seemed to be composed of different kinds of clouds, like the ones above
Proponents of the Cosmological Argument may argue that there must be an explanation for the series of dependent beings as a whole. However, one cannot argue that a collection of things has an overall explanation. A series of dependent beings is not in itself a single dependent being, just as a group of birds is not itself a bird (pg. 7). Now the first statement of the Principle of Sufficient Reason denies that there exists a being for which there is no explanation, so we cannot say that there is no reason for a dependent beings existence. The second part