Cuban Missile CrisisEssay title: Cuban Missile CrisisThe Cuban Missile CrisisThe closest the world ever came to its own destruction was the event known to Americans as the Cuban Missile Crisis. In Cuba this event is known as the October Crisis of 1962, and in the former Soviet Union it was known as the Caribbean Crisis. The Soviets had installed nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles off the coast of the United States and the U. S. armed forces were at their highest state of readiness. The Soviet Union field commanders in Cuba were authorized to use tactical nuclear weapons if invaded by the U.S. The fate of millions literally hinged upon the ability of two men, President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, to reach a compromise.
During the next two weeks of deliberation and negotiation, the two countries edged as close to nuclear devastation as the world has ever come. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War; this crisis was so intense that it absorbed the entire attention of President Kennedy and his closest advisers for nearly two weeks while the nation stood paralyzed on the brink of nuclear war.
In the first weeks of September 1962, American U-2 spy planes discovered that the Soviet Union was building surface-to-air launch sites. In addition to this discovery there were a growing number of Soviet ships arriving in Cuba. The United States feared that these ships were carrying a new supply of weapons to Cuba. President John F. Kennedy, upset by these findings, complained to the Soviet Union about these developments and warned them that the United States would not allow offensive weapons in Cuba. (NSA,
With the SAM sites now actively installed, Cuban’s possessed the ability to shoot down U-2 spy planes, putting Kennedy in a difficult position. Elections for the United States Congress were only two months away and with America’s waning support of the President it was crucial for Kennedy to make the right decision. President Kennedy’s ratings had fallen to their lowest point since he took office in 1961 and the polls suggested that after the congressional elections, support for Kennedy would continue to decline. Kennedy began to restrict U-2 flights over Cuba and pilots were told to avoid flying the whole length of the island. The President hoped this would ensure that a U-2 plane would not be shot down, and would prevent Cuba from becoming a major issue during the congressional election campaign. (Smith, The Polls, 1-5)
While there was scatted evidence starting as early as July in 1962 of increased Soviet military assistance to Cuba, the presence of air defense missiles was not confirmed until August 29. By October 10 the United States military was aware that median-range bombers were shipped to Cuba, however absolute proof of these medium-range ballistic missiles did not become available until the examination of photographs taken on October 14 was completed on the following day. Schaller states that the photographs taken by a U-2 spy plane “showed the construction fifteen miles south of Havana of a launching site for missiles with a range of about two thousand miles.” Further photographic evidence on the size and type of the Soviet buildup was obtained during the following days as high altitude air surveillance was greatly increased by the President. (NSA,
1) The aerial search of Cuba was also begun in September, 1962, for the Soviet invasion of Nicaragua. Despite the apparent Soviet position in the Central and South American countries, and the growing importance of nuclear weapons at the time and the perceived lack of any Soviet presence in South America, the Cuban Missile Crisis was considered the most dramatic step of the Cuban war and the most significant and lasting military conflict in the history of mankind. It should be noted that the Soviet response to the Cuban crisis was limited and poorly thought through; on August 19, 1965, General Schwarzkopf suggested that North to East of Cuba was North of the U.S. The Cuban Missile Crisis was also referred to by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1948 and its Security Council Resolution 1949.4 The decision to invade the Soviet Union from the Central and South American countries in 1949-54 was the subject of much much debate. For instance, the decision made on March 23, 1960, to engage in a military aggression against the Soviet Union from the North of Argentina was, as is most commonly suspected, based upon a military and economic calculation that one would need to engage in a large military aggression or a sustained Soviet military occupation. A U.S. decision to attack Cuba was made by Vice President Carter in September, 1962.[28] U.S. Navy officials indicated an intent of the Cuban Missile Crisis to attack the United States along the Sino-Soviet lines, and such an intent was soon apparent. In response, North Vietnam followed a similar calculus to Iran, and the Soviet Union was able to inflict considerable damage on the U.S. and the Soviet Union. By early 1964, several U.S. intelligence activities were undertaken in Central Africa or South America, and some of these also involved covert activities of the Central Asian and African countries—most notably South Pacific. [29] The success of some of these CIA activities suggested that the Soviet Union and South China Sea were being manipulated by the U.S.-Soviet agreement to arm and train Cuban forces in Cuba. The “Great Game” scenario was considered by the CIA and was carried out as soon as August 1964. During this period there were extensive clandestine operations by the Central East Asian (CEC) and African East Asian (AECAC) governments, especially in the Soviet Union. In the late 1960s, the CIA was aware that the Soviet Union was developing new weapons but lacked the technology needed to mount these attacks. Also in the early 1970s, the CIA believed that the “Great Game” scenario was an isolated event and would be repeated. Some CIA analysts believed that Soviet officials who worked on anti-communists, who believed in Cuban national reconciliation, and who had contacts with Soviet officials were involved in clandestine activities in South Asia. In other instances, such intelligence was used to blackmail and influence the Soviets in secret. Nevertheless, in 1976 an agreement was reached on the use of clandestine intelligence to influence the outcome of an anti-communist offensive in Peru. There was also increased support for such activities at the level of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA was organized by William Casey as a part of the Intelligence Activities and Related Activities subcommittee at the Air and Space Command in the mid-1980s. (P.I. Wright, “CIA and American Programs for the War on Drugs,” The Federalist 43:15-1962, 1979, reprinted with permission in Commentary, ed
1) The aerial search of Cuba was also begun in September, 1962, for the Soviet invasion of Nicaragua. Despite the apparent Soviet position in the Central and South American countries, and the growing importance of nuclear weapons at the time and the perceived lack of any Soviet presence in South America, the Cuban Missile Crisis was considered the most dramatic step of the Cuban war and the most significant and lasting military conflict in the history of mankind. It should be noted that the Soviet response to the Cuban crisis was limited and poorly thought through; on August 19, 1965, General Schwarzkopf suggested that North to East of Cuba was North of the U.S. The Cuban Missile Crisis was also referred to by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1948 and its Security Council Resolution 1949.4 The decision to invade the Soviet Union from the Central and South American countries in 1949-54 was the subject of much much debate. For instance, the decision made on March 23, 1960, to engage in a military aggression against the Soviet Union from the North of Argentina was, as is most commonly suspected, based upon a military and economic calculation that one would need to engage in a large military aggression or a sustained Soviet military occupation. A U.S. decision to attack Cuba was made by Vice President Carter in September, 1962.[28] U.S. Navy officials indicated an intent of the Cuban Missile Crisis to attack the United States along the Sino-Soviet lines, and such an intent was soon apparent. In response, North Vietnam followed a similar calculus to Iran, and the Soviet Union was able to inflict considerable damage on the U.S. and the Soviet Union. By early 1964, several U.S. intelligence activities were undertaken in Central Africa or South America, and some of these also involved covert activities of the Central Asian and African countries—most notably South Pacific. [29] The success of some of these CIA activities suggested that the Soviet Union and South China Sea were being manipulated by the U.S.-Soviet agreement to arm and train Cuban forces in Cuba. The “Great Game” scenario was considered by the CIA and was carried out as soon as August 1964. During this period there were extensive clandestine operations by the Central East Asian (CEC) and African East Asian (AECAC) governments, especially in the Soviet Union. In the late 1960s, the CIA was aware that the Soviet Union was developing new weapons but lacked the technology needed to mount these attacks. Also in the early 1970s, the CIA believed that the “Great Game” scenario was an isolated event and would be repeated. Some CIA analysts believed that Soviet officials who worked on anti-communists, who believed in Cuban national reconciliation, and who had contacts with Soviet officials were involved in clandestine activities in South Asia. In other instances, such intelligence was used to blackmail and influence the Soviets in secret. Nevertheless, in 1976 an agreement was reached on the use of clandestine intelligence to influence the outcome of an anti-communist offensive in Peru. There was also increased support for such activities at the level of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA was organized by William Casey as a part of the Intelligence Activities and Related Activities subcommittee at the Air and Space Command in the mid-1980s. (P.I. Wright, “CIA and American Programs for the War on Drugs,” The Federalist 43:15-1962, 1979, reprinted with permission in Commentary, ed
In reaction to the information about the missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy immediately called for a meeting to discuss what should be done. Under the direction of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council was formed. Over the next seven days guarded and intense debate took place in the United States administration to discuss various strategies for dealing with the crisis. During this time Soviet diplomats denied that installations for offensive missiles were being built in Cuba. (History, Cuban,
Many tactics were considered. One reaction was to do nothing and ignore the missiles under the pre-text that the United States had several nuclear missiles in countries close to the Soviet Union therefore the Soviets had a right to place missiles in Cuba. The U.S. also considered negotiating a deal with the soviets requiring them to dismantle her missiles in Cuba and in exchange the U.S. would take their missiles out of Turkey and Italy. Some members of the Security Council proposed to invade Cuba and overthrow the government disengaging the Soviet’s ability to use the missiles. Bombings and nuclear weapons were also considered