Central American HistoryEssay Preview: Central American HistoryReport this essayDespite this generally gloomy context for historical figures and for subsequent historians, many of our ideas about this period has slowly begun to change. This change has occurred not only because of recent research but also, and perhaps of more importance, because of the widespread discrediting of modern schemes of “development,” of left-wing or right-wing parentage, traceable in one form or another to the Liberal project for change of the 1870s and thereafter. Central America was indeed changed, and dramatically so, by the coffee-based revolutions of the middle to late nineteenth century but not the way that many on the Liberal side both before and after the revolutions may have imagined. Central American state structures were solidified in this period, even if not in the form of nationhood and nationalism hoped for by Liberals of the time. Likewise, many policies critical for ultimate Liberal success with coffee culture were begun by their Conservative enemies. Moreover, a substrata of social, demographic, and ethnic processes continued during this Conservative interlude that the Liberals could, at best, influence, redirect, or reclassify but hardly comprehend, much less control
Whatever ones interpretation, no one denies a series of facts which illustrate that the relationship has indeed been difficult and fraught with error and misunderstanding on all sides, facts which even Sandinista spokesmen freely admit ( Borge 1985; Hooker 1985; Cabezas 1985a). The unhappy reality is that, since the Sandinista revolution, large numbers of Miskito have fled the country and many more have been involuntarily relocated internally. A great many Miskito have joined military forces in outright rebellion against the Sandinista regime and between these and the Nicaraguan army a state of war exists with all the human suffering which that implies. Apart from military violence, outside humanitarian agencies have generally reported little tangible evidence to support the extreme charges made by some of massive terror and genocide, but under the turbulent conditions on the Atlantic coast numerous individual instances of harsh governmental action in their dealings
As one might expect, one of the other states quickly introduced the subject of confederation before the meetings began. This time it was Honduras that proposed broadening the scope of the sessions to consider what Honduras felt was the “underlying principle of any Central American conference.” The other nations agreed with numerous provisos. Guatemalas government felt that such a change in purpose would require time for study and urged a preliminary meeting for Guatemala City early in 1918 to draw up an agenda and to determine dates, places, and other details. Then El Salvador provoked an argument by suggesting that the United States and Mexico should be represented, too, as in 1907. The president of Nicaragua agreed to send a delegate provided
The Convention of 1892 was thus far more likely to be used to reach out to the other states than the Conference of 1881. The Conference’s decision about the delegates, the conditions of which can hardly be overstated, was made upon the advice of the secretary-teachers, who were then sent by a delegation of delegates from the five other states to London to consider their proposals. Their decision was duly received from Washington, in New York and received the following message of the 16th of June—
“The delegates will be appointed to meet the members of the Board in London on the 19th June in a general meeting, at which the Secretary-teachers and the representatives of the five other States will consider their and their country’s proposals. We consider that the delegates have been sent to London in a matter of the past few days, as they are ready to discuss their plans and plans of the past several days. In considering the proposed measures the United States and Mexico have no doubt, and shall hold with us, not to hold up a joint committee, but to consider their own merits.”†
As this conference did not go far enough, President Woodrow Wilson’s first address in 1892 referred to a meeting of the Conference convened the first and last Friday after Independence. He declared that he would hold an open door to further discussion between the two nations, particularly in relation to the subject of the confederation under which he hoped to settle it. But this is hardly a matter which the American delegates will find useful either in relation to the subject at large or as they contemplate their next steps — that is, the meeting of the Convention and of the President. (A few days later, in a letter to President Henry Wallace, General Secretary of the Conference, Wilson said: “It is perfectly clear that the best possible solution would be to have the meeting of the delegates at Washington, in a general assembly. By a simple and direct method. It would be our pleasure, because we are so highly informed about the United States, not to assume anything in the present position ; and we expect that the conference of our nation will be brought in at a very reasonable price, at the pleasure of the United States, to discuss matters on the ground when that is a thing of national importance.”᾽
Wilson also suggested an increase of the number of delegates for the confederation. To ensure this, he suggested that he would give two hours’ notice to those persons responsible for such conferences and to present them to Congress whenever he felt it fit. Such an increase could be made in about 15 minutes, and it would be sufficient to make the American president’s decision widely known and the meeting of the delegates of all five of the other States occur in about thirty minutes at once, for the purpose of sending a special delegate to the convention so as to make such a plan possible.
With all due respect, this convention on the subject in 1919 was a bit less than successful. In fact, with the exceptions of Great