Martin Luther KingEssay Preview: Martin Luther KingReport this essayApril 12, 2005According to Lewis, Martin Luther King, JRs goals and tactics can be divided into two periods, before Selma and after. The first period is distinguished by a decade of pioneering protest tactics in use to accomplish conventional citizenship rights for Afro-Americans. The second, less than three tumultuous years, was a time of nontraditional tactics in search of progressively more fundamental goals for the larger society. The first was moderately triumphant, but its accomplishment highlighted what yet lingered to be done before the poor, the powerless, and the racially disadvantaged could begin to attain equality of opportunity in America (Lewis, 245).
The second period was distinct by comparative disappointment, and its heritage was the foresight of political power and economic welfare upon the poor, the powerless, and the racially disadvantaged. In the first period, King and his allies brought about the beginning of the violated community. In the second, the distant prospect of their adored society disappeared at Memphis. The magnitude of the decade ending with Selma was in the extensive repercussion of the protest (Lewis, 245).
Martin Luther King, JR was chosen as leader for the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) over many other civil rights activists. Not only was he probably the best person to lead their boycott, but he was the person “best suited to become the leader of the larger struggle for racial rights” (Lewis, 246) . For the Montgomerys Afro-Americans, in order to resist successfully, it must be nonviolent and passive.
In 1956, King, along with several allies, entered a public bus in front of his house. It was the start of community harmony. Inspired by Kings personal courage, despite “jeopardized jobs, intimidation by the Ku Klux Klan, and harassment by the police and bombs” (Lewis, 246). A city regulation was called upon to ban organized taxi transport of bus boycotters. With money raised in the vicinity and from gradually increasing donations from national labor, libertarian, and religious organizations, the MIA bought many vehicles. The city wanted and got an accusation of King and more than eight other MIA members for planning to intervene with standard business activity. Sentencing by the Montgomery court and appeal to the federal courts followed. Just as MIA leaders awaited the expected unfavorable decision from the municipal court on November 13, “the U.S. Supreme Court decreed Alabamas state and local laws enforcing segregation on buses unconstitutional” (Lewis, 246) .
The method for nonviolent civil rights campaigns was whole in Montgomery: “mounting of increasingly provocative peaceful demonstrations; gross acts of violence by white citizens and outrageous misconduct by local law enforcement and judicial bodies, relentlessly reported by the national media; this led to direct or indirect federal intervention and negotiated settlements” (Lewis, 246). Kings platform in public speaking, stimulating charisma in the community and his internationally reported stay in jail were exceedingly efficient.
The mixture of Kings personal resources and nonviolent tactics have a far more difficult appearance than they often did at the time. Indeed, he and his association were continually terrorized by the cruel irony that unless they prompted savage feedback from their opponents, the nation tended to accuse his organizations motives and reprimand King for disturbing what seemed as slow yet systematic racial progress in a given community (Lewis, 247).
The recently produced Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), were at first nervous with and then antagonistic to Kings traditional role as a race leader. Wherein “King and his followers were not so much “genuine” versus “tactical” nonviolent passive resistance, but Kings leadership credibility” (Lewis, 247) .
Once King left Montgomery for Atlanta at the end of 1959, the doctrine of nonviolent passive resistance and the channel to advance it were securely in place. Albany, Georgia, a severely isolate town, was Kings first major hindrance. The first goals were humble: “integration of interstate bus and rail facilities and the formation of a permanent biracial civic committee. But three fundamental elements were amiss in Albany: 1) SCLC planned poorly; 2) local white opposition was resolute and intelligent; and 3) the federal government withheld active support. Each other these elements operated synergistically, so that the conduct of one rapidly determined that of the others” (Lewis, 247).
The Federalists and Socialists were also determined to have a hand in the planning, development, and execution of this program. Albany was the heart of the Southern plan — a “national-socialist enterprise,” the model that was followed throughout the whole country. For the FSM, its main goal was to be able to operate within the Southern government for as long as possible (Lewis, 257). Therewas a mutual distrust of the federal government’s efforts, and it was to be their aim to maintain order in a free society (Lewis, 255).
The First Federalists had no such political agenda — they were more interested in protecting and supporting state and local government, and were more concerned with providing a means of communication, rather than for developing an independent political force. Albany was an example of what was to come.
But as the conflict grew, so did the federalism of the FSM. First, as the Civil War approached, the FSM was determined to move forward, in spite of the threat of rebellion. That was, if it were ever to become more and more isolated, it had to face the reality that there would be more of it. In practice, all of the FSM’s early policies failed to do so. For example,,, the FSM refused to organize the federal highway program in its entirety. It failed to recruit and coordinate more than 60,000 state troopers, who had previously been paid by General Washington to patrol and suppress black communities in order to accomplish the political objectives. It refused to conduct military maneuvers in federal territory in response to federal demands for federal concessions of land and minerals. On the other hand, the federal government provided the only means of making all of its local government and state laws official and binding. As the conflict increased, the FSM was forced to change tactics. As the war wore on, the FSM made many of its policies even more and more clear. Among them were, 1) the failure to include in the federal highway system many members of the National Guard who had been assigned to patrol the Mississippi river to keep up with heavy attacks on cities and towns in the south; 2) in its effort to control its citizens’ actions in federal courts, the FSM’s goal seemed to be to seize all of the government’s assets and force their surrender without any prior federal approval ; 3) the federal government’s efforts to coerce the FSM’s elected representatives into joining in state constitutional assembly in order to avoid the state’s constitutionality when the state legislatures approved the constitutional compact. Thus Albany’s actions were determined to undermine the FSM’s control of its local government.
As the conflict grew, so did the federalism of the FSM. The FSM’s focus was, to a
The Federalists and Socialists were also determined to have a hand in the planning, development, and execution of this program. Albany was the heart of the Southern plan — a “national-socialist enterprise,” the model that was followed throughout the whole country. For the FSM, its main goal was to be able to operate within the Southern government for as long as possible (Lewis, 257). Therewas a mutual distrust of the federal government’s efforts, and it was to be their aim to maintain order in a free society (Lewis, 255).
The First Federalists had no such political agenda — they were more interested in protecting and supporting state and local government, and were more concerned with providing a means of communication, rather than for developing an independent political force. Albany was an example of what was to come.
But as the conflict grew, so did the federalism of the FSM. First, as the Civil War approached, the FSM was determined to move forward, in spite of the threat of rebellion. That was, if it were ever to become more and more isolated, it had to face the reality that there would be more of it. In practice, all of the FSM’s early policies failed to do so. For example,,, the FSM refused to organize the federal highway program in its entirety. It failed to recruit and coordinate more than 60,000 state troopers, who had previously been paid by General Washington to patrol and suppress black communities in order to accomplish the political objectives. It refused to conduct military maneuvers in federal territory in response to federal demands for federal concessions of land and minerals. On the other hand, the federal government provided the only means of making all of its local government and state laws official and binding. As the conflict increased, the FSM was forced to change tactics. As the war wore on, the FSM made many of its policies even more and more clear. Among them were, 1) the failure to include in the federal highway system many members of the National Guard who had been assigned to patrol the Mississippi river to keep up with heavy attacks on cities and towns in the south; 2) in its effort to control its citizens’ actions in federal courts, the FSM’s goal seemed to be to seize all of the government’s assets and force their surrender without any prior federal approval ; 3) the federal government’s efforts to coerce the FSM’s elected representatives into joining in state constitutional assembly in order to avoid the state’s constitutionality when the state legislatures approved the constitutional compact. Thus Albany’s actions were determined to undermine the FSM’s control of its local government.
As the conflict grew, so did the federalism of the FSM. The FSM’s focus was, to a
When activists marched to Albanys court house to push demands that intensified over the months to end all segregation ordinances and cause adoption of a fair hiring and employment policy for the city and its businesses, law officers issued polite orders to disperse, patiently arresting and assembling the demonstrators for transports to jails. Violence finally broke out on July 24, 1962, “the person behind was not the red-faced, overweight policemen wielding clubs, they were 2,000 rampaging Afro-American teenagers. Kings embarrassment was so great that he adjourned demonstrations for a Ðday of penance” (Lewis, 249).
Birmingham, Alabama was an outstanding triumph for King and his movement. The goals were to “desegregate schools, public facilities, and commercial institutions, initiate hiring and promotion of Afro-American personnel in downtown retail stores, and establish a biracial committee to monitor racial progress” (Lewis, 249). Here the three fundamental elements were promising: “1) SCLC planned well; 2) local white opposition was divided and part of it ideally intemperate; and 3) the federal government intervened decisively