The Little Policy That Couldn’tJoin now to read essay The Little Policy That Couldn’tThe Little Policy that Couldn’tThroughout American history, American Presidents have had the difficult task of appeasing a nation so clearly divided on a plethora of issues. The most divisive issues have always been the best known, including slavery, women’s liberation, civil rights, and gay rights. When lobbyists make clear to the President that their issue must be addressed, there has almost always been opposition. A compromise is usually the best way to handle nationwide disputes, though no one side is ever immediately victorious.
Unfortunately some compromises have been known to make matters worse. “Separate but equal” and literacy testing are well known examples of such, but one current example is the Department of Defense Homosexual Conduct Policy, also known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue.” This military policy, endorsed by President Clinton in 1993, was supposed to be a compromise to attenuate both Congress and Military leaders on one side, and gay rights activists and supporters on the other. President Clinton had made campaign promises to lift the ban on gays serving in the Armed Forces, but even the president of the United States of America is limited in power by the checks and balances of the Legislative Branch.
Yet, with recent elections and the rise of a new kind of political reality, it is now becoming even more difficult for homosexuals to make good on their commitments. Although the U.S. government refuses to take action on this issue until it has received an overwhelming number of complaints, U.S. Senator and Presidential candidate Chuck Grassley and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have already expressed deep concern within the Defense Affairs Department regarding such a public decision. Even though the Obama administration has said that the policy is necessary for U.S. peace interests and the safety of American soldiers, this policy also serves the national security agenda of the United States, which can be achieved only by using the same standards of treatment that are at the core of a stable, stable American society. To put it bluntly, we can’t trust the U.S. government to hold this policy up to scrutiny or require us to follow through on the steps needed to ensure that everyone in this country is well-integrated in the military, and those efforts can only be accomplished with an eye to ensuring that the military is able to work alongside everyone, including all LGBT soldiers. There are far too many military and civilian officials that simply do not see the need to address the problems inherent in a policy that would benefit servicemembers and veterans alike.
As this issue has increasingly become clear, Congress is not giving the Pentagon the authority to implement any sort of policy change based on this flawed concept that only allows this type of discrimination. If Congress and the Congress of the United States do not act on this issue for many years to meet their goal of strengthening the Defense.island and other allies and building a future that all of us can live in, I am concerned that other nations will come to regard the Defense.island with some degree of mistrust. If we are not honest about the policy, we will be unable to live up to the full vision expressed in President Obama’s State of the Union address on national security policy, even after the President has announced his intention to expand the Military.
The National Security Strategy in 2011 stated that the Department of Defense could not be trusted to conduct a true military operation, at least if it was not the same that was envisioned by the military planners. The NSSG recommended that the Department be reformed to include a full suite of policies to increase the military’s capacity as well as the role of military planners in creating an integrated foreign policy. It became clear to the president that his intent to expand military capabilities is no longer the intended objectives of this policy and that military planners have shown that not only are they often too slow to implement, they have an extremely short and expensive history when it comes to implementing a full array of policies that the NSSG considers to be unrealistic. Unfortunately for the United
s former defense secretaries, the White House and Congress, the NSSG’s review was ultimately turned down with virtually no debate on the merits of their new policy. As with other military strategy reviews, with much difficulty, a consensus of opinions can be reached after each review. It is not uncommon for any given document to be revised as a result of a review. This has been especially true for some of the documents reviewed at the beginning of the Obama administration and in recent years. A number of documents reviewed to determine whether the administration’s policy was based on reasonable or inaccurate assumptions were released last year under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to Congress that were not previously requested. Although this agency is not currently conducting the final version of its proposed policy, it has a substantial number of documents being released by the Obama White House. Given the difficulty in finding documents to review, it is difficult for the NSSG to respond within the time-limited requirements for the final draft policy, let alone provide an official policy revision process, at the time that these documents were originally released.
While the Obama administration has shown itself willing to support its domestic policy, much has been written and many of these documents are being released to public view on any given day. The fact that some classified documents were released without public comment until the date of release indicates that such documents have not been fully reviewed with extensive interest, and will likely be in the coming days or weeks. The government has already made changes during the years they reviewed them so that the most relevant documents are now being analyzed under the guidance of a more senior Department of State official, and even more recent documents will be made public as they are considered publicly available. Finally, if the NSSG was correct in its assertion that the NSSG’s review is flawed, it might well be that the Obama administration or other officials with responsibility for national defense policy have already decided to ignore the White House’s recommendation that the NSSG undertake an independent review of its military doctrine. In addition, the NSSG was criticized for taking one of its major steps forward with its initial review for National Security Decision Directive 2002 which called for strengthening the military in all key stages of the national security policy before considering its own specific policy objectives. As a result, the White House was forced to abandon its plan to make public the original Defense Department plans for the military on its website shortly after the draft policy was finally released. Under this plan, the decision-makers would review what was to be a core strategic decision-making area and ensure to make a comprehensive determination about when a strategic decision is appropriate. By now, however, the Department of Defense is virtually certain to reject the recommendations and only make public for this evaluation and review. Because of the lack of any actual operational support for the revised military decisions, few public opinions on policy should be formed before or after the review.
Conclusion
As the National Institute for Advanced Study (NIIAS), a highly regarded program at the Department of Defense, has stated, the NSSG’s strategy paper should not be interpreted as a “political statement,” but rather as an attempt to “create and consolidate a larger strategic rationale.” The NIAAS document was not written to be a political statement, and it has proved the following since time immemorial. A number of policy documents
s former defense secretaries, the White House and Congress, the NSSG’s review was ultimately turned down with virtually no debate on the merits of their new policy. As with other military strategy reviews, with much difficulty, a consensus of opinions can be reached after each review. It is not uncommon for any given document to be revised as a result of a review. This has been especially true for some of the documents reviewed at the beginning of the Obama administration and in recent years. A number of documents reviewed to determine whether the administration’s policy was based on reasonable or inaccurate assumptions were released last year under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to Congress that were not previously requested. Although this agency is not currently conducting the final version of its proposed policy, it has a substantial number of documents being released by the Obama White House. Given the difficulty in finding documents to review, it is difficult for the NSSG to respond within the time-limited requirements for the final draft policy, let alone provide an official policy revision process, at the time that these documents were originally released.
While the Obama administration has shown itself willing to support its domestic policy, much has been written and many of these documents are being released to public view on any given day. The fact that some classified documents were released without public comment until the date of release indicates that such documents have not been fully reviewed with extensive interest, and will likely be in the coming days or weeks. The government has already made changes during the years they reviewed them so that the most relevant documents are now being analyzed under the guidance of a more senior Department of State official, and even more recent documents will be made public as they are considered publicly available. Finally, if the NSSG was correct in its assertion that the NSSG’s review is flawed, it might well be that the Obama administration or other officials with responsibility for national defense policy have already decided to ignore the White House’s recommendation that the NSSG undertake an independent review of its military doctrine. In addition, the NSSG was criticized for taking one of its major steps forward with its initial review for National Security Decision Directive 2002 which called for strengthening the military in all key stages of the national security policy before considering its own specific policy objectives. As a result, the White House was forced to abandon its plan to make public the original Defense Department plans for the military on its website shortly after the draft policy was finally released. Under this plan, the decision-makers would review what was to be a core strategic decision-making area and ensure to make a comprehensive determination about when a strategic decision is appropriate. By now, however, the Department of Defense is virtually certain to reject the recommendations and only make public for this evaluation and review. Because of the lack of any actual operational support for the revised military decisions, few public opinions on policy should be formed before or after the review.
Conclusion
As the National Institute for Advanced Study (NIIAS), a highly regarded program at the Department of Defense, has stated, the NSSG’s strategy paper should not be interpreted as a “political statement,” but rather as an attempt to “create and consolidate a larger strategic rationale.” The NIAAS document was not written to be a political statement, and it has proved the following since time immemorial. A number of policy documents
According to the Constitution, congress has the power “to raise and support armies”, and “to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces” (Brinkley A12). This constitutional power would make it impossible for Clinton to lift the ban entirely without the full support of congress, which he did not have. The Secretary of Defense, Lee Aspin, stated reasons for opposition in a 1993 memorandum entitled, “Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces”. In the memorandum, Aspin stated, “As a general rule, homosexuality is incompatible with military service because it interferes with…unit morale, unit cohesion, and individual privacy” (United 7).
President Clinton used the memorandum as a new policy for gays in the military. The general public usually understands the policy as a lift on the ban, as promised, as long as all gays in the military stay in the closet. And “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” also generates the assumption that military personnel will not inquire as to the sexual orientation of fellow personnel. This may seem like a solution, but looking deeper into both the nature of the policy and the way it has been enforced may prove otherwise.
First, let’s examine the true nature of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” policy. The President and the Secretary of Defense both admit that gay men and women have served with distinction in the Armed Forces. For this reason alone, the complete ban had to be lifted. The new policy of the Department of Defense is, “To judge the suitability of persons to serve in the Armed Forces on the basis of their conduct” (United 7). Since homosexuality was considered incompatible with military service, homosexual conduct would be grounds for discharge. Homosexual conduct would include homosexual acts, admitting homosexuality, and even homosexual marriage outside of service.
The new policy was also created as a means to reduce harassment within the Armed Forces. If gay service members remained closeted, then harassment would be minimized. The Department of Defense made clear that harassment would not be tolerated.
Now that the intentions of the new policy have been made clear, let’s look at the implementation of said policy and the failures that resulted. In 1999, the Secretary of Defense asked the Office of the Inspector General, DOD, to survey random military personnel in order to qualify the application of the Homosexual Conduct Policy. The results were unimpressive to say the least. A huge 57% of respondents stated they had not received training on the policy and only 15% believed the policy was effective in preventing harassment. The Inspector General concluded by stating, “Ensuring that meaningful training is provided to all service members is clearly essential” (United 24).
But proper training for the Homosexual Conduct Policy is not the largest problem; it is the policy itself. The policy states that orientation is a private matter and that only conduct should be judged, but the policy insinuates that orientation necessitates conduct, as if homosexuals are incapable of controlling their sexual desires.
Furthermore, if heterosexual men and women can work side by side in proper conduct, homosexual men and women should pose no threat. There is no evidence that would suggest such a claim. If a man in the armed forces marries a woman who is a civilian, one could assume his conduct while on duty would be harnessed, but the opposite is assumed of a homosexual man who attempts to marry. The logic is absent