Leaders in Conflict: Competative Orientation in the Structural Change ModelLeaders in Conflict: Competative Orientation in the Structural Change ModelLEADERS IN CONFLICT: COMPETITIVE ORIENTATIONLeaders in Conflict: Competitive Orientation in the Structural Change ModelPaul OlsenTeacher’s CollegeColumbia UniversityIntroductionThe question concerning the conflict in existence between my battalion commander and the other company commanders of his unit have troubled me since I changed command on 10 May 2007. I had hoped to make sense of why he behaved and lead in the manner that he did, but I have been unable to reconcile the leadership style or his personality when I compare it to my own or the personalities of the other company commanders. According to the dual concern model (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Fillery, 1975; Rahim, 1983, 1986; Thomas, 1976) implies that conflict style is determined by two independent variables of self-concern and other-concern. Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) define conflict style as the manner in which a person most commonly deals with conflict. I had assumed he exhibited those directive and micromanaging behaviors due to the complex, ambiguous, high stress environment of Baghdad, Iraq following the Samarra bombings of February 2006. This is consistent with a person who exhibits a high-degree of self-concern and seeks to resolve conflicts through contending and problem solving instead of employing yielding or avoiding strategies.
Although company commanders and battalion task organization changed several times, the low level of mutual trust, respect and confidence between the leader and the subordinates remained constant due to the battalion commander’s autocratic style and desire to control a situation. LTC Archer’s conflict resolution style remained remarkably consistent and took on the characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy during the deployment, validating Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations (1973). Deutsch assumes that if we understand the effects of a process, we have knowledge of what conditions facilitate that process and the conditions affect the constructive or destructive resolution of a conflict. In the case of LTC Archer, his competitive orientation and autocratic leadership style resulted in poor communication, increased power distance between himself and his leaders, and a general lack of trust toward the Soldiers and leaders of his battalion.
LTC Archer was a conscientious and ethically motivated officer who often expressed his frustration with the seemingly impenetrable, inter-related motives and often contradictory information that typified the ethnic conflict between the Sunni and Shia tribal cultures that inhabited his battalion’s area of operations. This complex and intractable conflict created a high degree of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) in an officer who was normally able to influence others through physical presence and sheer force of will. In an effort to bring some measure of control and structure to an otherwise chaotic situation, he implemented a very rigid leadership style that was exemplified by top-down planning, attention to minor details, and restrictive command and control of his subordinate leaders. This example of displacement was not well received by his own subordinate leaders, who viewed his actions as an attempt to undermine their authority and autonomy. Additionally, LTC Archer’s subordinate leaders perceived that their battalion commander did not trust them and would not support them in a crisis situation. This destructive dynamic was most apparent during sustained combat operations in the ethnically mixed district of Al-Doura, Baghdad during the first week of May 2006. The events that unfolded over the next 96 hours provided a snapshot of the conflict that the battalion faced both in terms of an armed conflict between an elusive, adaptive insurgent force and the inter-personal conflict the battalion leadership had with their battalion commander during the prosecution of this operation.
I had recently assumed command of an infantry rifle company that had transitioned to a motorized infantry role upon arrival in Baghdad during November 2005. The other company commanders were all senior to me in terms of experience and age, the majority of them had been in command since the unit was activated in October 2004. The senior non-commissioned officers of my new company were also experienced and had all served within the battalion since its initial formation; most were combat veterans of either Iraq or Afghanistan. This organization developed a high level of cohesion or crosscut structural strength (Coleman, 1957) due to the shared bonds of Army Values, shared hardships, performance orientation, and well-disciplined aggression.
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The following section takes a look at the military culture, values, and attitudes of my new company commanding officers. . . . When an Infantryman, when he or she identifies as a combat veteran, does something that would give his or her a serious and productive experience; when he or she becomes employed by a company; when he or she gets paid more than necessary; when these things influence how an individual decides to operate or to care for his or her family; and when these things, as far as I’m aware, are part of that culture (Coleman, 1957). Although they are not yet a major force, they are a major part of what I call the ‘Culture of Success’ or the ‘Culture of Failure.’ The Culture of Success is a combination of a culture of hard work and hard work hard work, which they believe have made this Army a more successful nation. This is particularly important with respect to the first two sections of this section, as such section has been in operation for over three and a half years and I’ve often said before “A culture of failure will not allow us to survive.” The only thing that we’re going to get is a culture of success that brings about a sense of achievement and empowerment, a sense of accomplishment when everyone has been treated fairly and justly; an expectation of honor and fairness in the workplace, respect and admiration, and an appreciation of the sacrifice made to defend our nation against foreign intrusions and the barbarity of wars, as well as the dignity necessary to serve and carry out our duties (Coleman and Smith, 1972). The Culture of Success provides an example that shows how the culture of failure in the Army can be used to provide the basis for effective leadership and training for the Army, through the military’s education system by including all of the positive traits found in an individual’s culture, including honesty, courage, and good nature among its ranks, such as a sense of responsibility and self-confidence, commitment to the organization of the army, and service to national security (Coleman, 1957). These values are shared by all rank-and-file members and they can be found on every other officer’s uniform and in all the military and civilian organizational documents. In addition, the new military culture encourages men and women of diverse abilities to work together successfully and achieve all of the above to gain valuable benefits. The military culture begins as a matter of survival and is used by many to support the Army’s survival. It encourages men to become effective in combat environments: when they perform their duties with all confidence, they are able to provide an opportunity for success, especially when the situation or the situation requires courage and dedication, even in the face of hostile behavior, to support the troops, or carry out duty within a given area of action. The military culture also has certain responsibilities for the service members and the civilian members of the Army. Those who are selected or selected for this culture may be part of an organization with