Peace Had Never Been Helpful to the Khmer Rouge CauseEssay Preview: Peace Had Never Been Helpful to the Khmer Rouge CauseReport this essayExplain the purpose of post-revolutionary purges. Are they necessary for the survival of the revolutionary state?“Peace had never been helpful to the Khmer Rouge cause”Post-revolutionary purges are necessary for the survival of the revolutionary state because they allow the new government to secure their own regime, wipe away remnants of the old regime and ensure that any interference, whether internal or external, can be easily and effectively quashed. In December 1976, the year after the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia, leader Pol Pot declared to the Central Committee that “there is a sickness inside the Party, born in the years [of struggle]”, a phrase reminiscent of Stalin’s description of communist enemies as “an ulcer in a healthy body”. For the revolutionary government of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, a post-revolutionary purge was necessary for several reasons. The first was to rid the new regime of enemies, both internal and external. Any Chinese, Vietnamese or Chan Muslim living in Cambodia was killed, along with anyone who held a position of responsibility with the previous government. One Khmer Rouge slogan ran “better to destroy ten innocent people then let one enemy go free”. Rich land-owners and anyone with a university education was also killed under the Khmer Rouge, whether from direct execution or malnutrition. Another reason for the post-revolutionary purges in Cambodia was that the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot attempted to learn from the mistakes of both Mao and Stalin. China, Russia and Cambodia had a large proportion of their populations made up of agricultural land-workers so it made sense to make them the focus of the revolution at the expense of the rest of Cambodian society. The Khmer Rouge hoped to emulate Russia and China in some ways, while avoiding what they saw as mistakes i.e. taking too long, and suffering too many enemies of the regime to live. The results of the post-revolutionary purges in Cambodia were catastrophic. A letter from former Khmer Rouge officer Hun Sen, dated 3 July 1979, requests international aid and goes onto say that under the four years of Khmer Rouge rule approximately 3 million of Cambodia’s 7.25 million inhabitants had died. The remaining four million were suffering from malnutrition and disease, and 2.25 million were threatened by imminent starvation. For the purpose of this essay deaths resulting from malaria, starvation and malnutrition are counted as being the result of the post-revolutionary purges. Post-revolutionary purges are necessary for any revolutionary government if they are to consolidate their hold on a turbulent society, and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was no exception.
One reason for post-revolutionary purges is the extermination of enemies, whether they be ideological (anti-communist) or political. Any opposition to the regime was viewed as treason, and was generally followed by torture, a false confession to belonging to either the CIA or KGB (often, adversely, both) and death. An example of how determined the Khmer Rouge were to find enemies is the case of English teacher John Dewhurst, who was captured in 1978 by Khmer forces while on holiday. After repeated electric shocks he вЂ?admitted’ that “I am a CIA agent who officially works as a teacher in Japan… My father was a CIA agent whose cover was headmaster of Benton Road elementary school”. John Dewhurst was later executed and his body burned. The Khmer Rouge saw this ruthlessness as being for the greater good, with only the truly guilty being executed. Pol Pot saw the Cambodian psyche as having innate failings which could only be overcome by strict totalitarian rules. This would be done for the common good. Under the Khmer Rouge children were removed from their families, supposedly to foster a greater link with the Khmer Rouge. Under the Khmer Rouge they received political indoctrination rather than formal education, making them perfect to carry out many of Pol Pot’s killings. The capture of anti-revolutionaries (anyone suspected of being anti-communist, a traitor to the party or merely unnecessary to the cause) meant that they “must be tortured fiercely in order that we may obtain a complete understanding of their organisation… all methods, and all political and military measures must be employed”. In 1999 Deuch (real name Kaing Khek Iev), director of Khmer Rouge prison Tuol Sleng, head of Pol Pot’s secret police and responsible for the deaths of over 20 000 men, women and children, admitted that the purges had been planned as early as 1971; “Whoever was arrested must die. It was the rule of the party… Even children. This was the policy, the orders. No-one could leave S-21 (Tuol Sleng) alive”. By 1978 the purges had reached such a level that Tuol Sleng was full, and when 300 Khmer Rouge soldiers were bought in for вЂ?questioning’ Deuch was told not to bother interrogating them but just to kill them outright. Post-revolutionary purges were carried out under the Khmer Rouge supposedly in order to protect the regime from those who wanted to bring it down but, like the Terror after the French Revolution, it grew too big to control. While Khmer troops fought Vietnamese troops on the border Son Sen, Khmer Minister for Defence, ordered the deaths of over 100 000 “Vietnamese minds with Khmer bodies” in six days. The purpose of these purges was to discourage opposition and to promote the communist Khmer ideal of a classless, agricultural society. The Khmer Rouge, like their contemporaries in China and Russia, believed that they were carrying out these purges for the right reasons, however it soon became apparent that no-one was immune and that they were doing Cambodia more harm than good.
The post-revolutionary purges were also an attempt to save the revolutionary state from disaster, and to overcome the obstacles which Pol Pot saw that Mao and Stalin faced. They were part of a grand plan to go from a Monarchy to an agricultural communist state in the least possible amount of time. The similarities between Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, China under Mao and Russia under Stalin are striking. One similarity between post-revolutionary Cambodia, China and Russia was the use of indoctrination, especially effective when used on young malleable minds. This indoctrination was taken to extremes in Cambodia, where the combination of ideological training and the deprivation of basic necessities such as food and sleep, made it easier for the upper echelons of Khmer Rouge society to mould young people a la Mao’s Red Guard.
The Mao¬²Ð‚™s regime and the social structure had to undergo the utmost training and discipline, but in order to take any chance it would have to put the whole social fabric and the revolutionary class behind it, for its position was only at a point where things could be carried out. Even if the revolution did not turn out for the good the Chinese Government would not allow such radical ideas to enter the system. This left the Communist Party with a lot of internal contradictions, although when it tried to break off in 1975 all the opposition parties would have tried. Only a small percentage had any real power, and all of these opposition parties were either loyal to Mao and Stalin, or were totally dedicated to the Mao¬²¬°, Mao¬²°, or were even the least popular Mao¬²¬¬% of the Party membership.
Communist Party membership is a very different issue from the situation under communism, where the leadership is the most influential force, with the most influence over the Party internal relations.
According to this study:
This would have given rise to a theory about the importance of the “Party internal and external”. A leader with an enormous capacity is able to lead a party effectively without anyone having much experience in leadership, without the benefit of “leadership experience”, and without any experience outside the system. An internal experience of ‘leadership experience’ is an experience that one can carry forward as a leader regardless of personal or official experience (which is at the root of this theory).
The Chinese political and cultural system and culture is still very different, and is much more developed as regards the concept of hierarchy and how the different roles of leadership and policy interact with each other. As a result, leadership would not become so much of a matter of being the top “boss of the village”, as it would be if that did not exist at all.
The Cultural Revolution and the Cultural Revolution of Cultural Revolution
The Great Proletarian Cultural Change in China was a tremendous development of modern society. Many of its fundamental ideas started from Mao’s theory that Marxism and Mao¬²² were the most important forces that brought about a new order which was able to overcome and even overthrow the old order, from which the system of oppression and oppression continued. This brought about the creation of the CCP, the Communist Party of China, and its subsequent period of development:
One could imagine the people of the countryside growing up to understand that this government, which is considered by many to be socialist, is actually a dictatorship. It allows a few wealthy people and a handful of top bureaucrats to exploit and exploit the vast majority of peasants in the countryside for their own private profit, just like the US government controls the news in China. To the bourgeoisie and to those around them, in the form of the CCP, the concept of “democracy” is extremely important. As a revolutionary people of the countryside of the Soviet Union, we were already there.
But the CCP turned into a dictatorship because of the “culture war”. We saw some interesting ways of how this culture wars were brought about thanks to the Mao, Stalin and Mao¬²¬¬:
This ideology, which became more common during the Cultural