Is the Good Friday Agreement Fundementally Flawed as a Counter Terrorist Strategy
Is the Good Friday Agreement Fundementally Flawed as a Counter Terrorist Strategy
Is the Good Friday Peace Agreement Fundamentally Flawed as A Counter Terrorist Strategy?
Since its birth on 10 April 1998, the Good Friday Agreement has been fraught with crisis after crisis. The executive was suspended in February 2000 then reinstated five months later. The main crux of these crises is a dispute over decommissioning of weapons. In Northern Ireland itself there has been no marked decrease in violence, it is just not reported on as much in the worlds press. In a rare feature story of recent times, one reads of young catholic children being among the victims of abuse from Protestants over territorial claims to area. Yet there are few reports of the continuing violence that occurs on a day-to-day basis.
In examining whether the peace agreement is flawed as a counter terrorist strategy one must consider a number of factors. What spirit the agreement is trying to convey is fundamental to the discussion. Then, who are the terrorists that it is attempting to counter, if at all? But first consideration will be given to other peace agreements that have succeeded.
Following 15 years of Civil war in Lebanon the Taif Accord was drawn up outlining a new political and social consensus. The basis of this agreement was to form a power sharing government so that all communities may be represented in parliament. Unlike Northern Ireland the issues of decommissioning, ceasefires and dissolution of paramilitary forces were not featured during negotiations; only until the new government was formed were they tackled. Disarmament became the major problem with, on one side, Lebanese forces arguing that a more favourable communal balance had to be achieved, and, on the other, Hizballah claiming right to arm as a result of their liberation war with Israel. On a social level, however, progress was made with ten thousand Christians and Muslims being integrated into the Army and Police. Eventually partial voluntary decommissioning began with weapons being handed over to their origins, namely the armed forces, or exported to other conflicts.
The success of the Taif Accord was to a genuine commitment to peace, highlighted by the fact that no third party organisation was required to oversee events; instead it was handled by the newly formed government.
In October 1992 the Mozambique government and Renamo, the Mozambican National Resistance, signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome after fifteen years of civil war. In this case a third party, the Italians, handled negotiations. The basis for this agreement was that the government would adopt a multi-party democratic system so that the Renamo who become a legitimate political party could reach power peacefully. Militarily, the security forces were restructured with limitations placed on the armed forces size, the dismantling of private and irregular troops and a restructuring of the police force.
The agreement was faced with a problem of mutual distrust and unwillingness to relinquish arms. The UN, in an effort to create trust continued with the demobilization of forces by creating assembly points for arms collection, however, it was not until one year later that arms began to appear. Along with the weapons amnesty came a program to reintegrate combatants into society. The UN efforts to facilitate this were education