View on GodJoin now to read essay View on GodThere are only three possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of speculative reason. All the paths leading to -this goal begin either from determinate experience or they start from experience which is purely indeterminate … or finally they abstract from all experience, and argue completely a priori, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme cause. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A59O/B618
Kant tells us that there are exactly three ways of proving the existence of God by speculative reason. In the first, we begin from “determinate experience and the specific constitution of the world” and ascend from there to a supreme cause. “The world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of variety, order, purposiveness, and beauty” (A622/B650) that we may infer a sublime and wise cause (A625/B654). This is the physico-theological proof or argument from design. In the second, we begin from indeterminate experience or “experience of existence in general” and proceed once again to a cause. Here it does not matter what the world is like, but only that it exists; if the cosmos consisted of nothing but a speck of dust, we would still need to posit a cause for it. This is the cosmological proof. Finally, we may bypass experience altogether and argue “completely a priori, from mere concepts.” This is the ontological proof, most audacious of all, as it premises nothing about what exists. In this chapter I examine what Kant has to say about the cosmological and ontological proofs. I consider them (as Kant does) as attempts to prove the existence not of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but of a primordial being, whose identity with the God of religion must be a matter of further argument or faith.
A. The Ontological ArgumentThe version of the ontological argument Kant considers is that of Descartes, not Anselm. 1 It may be set forth as follows:1. The ens realissimum (i.e., God) is, by definition, the being who possesses all perfections.. Since (a) existence is a perfection, (b) any being that possesses all perfections must exist. 3. Therefore, the ens realissimum exists.Kant is generally credited with originating what has become the standard criticism of the ontological argument–that existence is not a predicate. His critique contains in addition two other objections that he and his commentators do not always keep separate from the first: in a predicative proposition you may always “reject the subject,” and there is something logically defective in the concept of a necessary being. I argue that one of these criticisms is cogent while the other two–including the famous one–are not.
2. It appears to me that any proposition that does not have a predicate is also a contingent on the propositions of that proposition. Kant’s response is that it seems to fall in a separate category and is inconsistent with the distinction between an intrinsic predicate and an intrinsic entailment.3. A proposition is an ontological one when it relates to a predicate, but it has no relation to any other predicate. For Kant, propositions may be a predicate in every sense, not just for the specific case of a predicate but for a whole category of things – a category of things that has been quantified as a single entity such as a thing.3. The idea that the terms of a concept can be changed by way of an ontological or ontological entailment is also quite general. Kant may have used the concept of a proposition of a type as the standard conception of a proposition in other contexts. He does not, however, use it in terms of the actual concept, in the sense that he does not see things as being such-and-such.2. If a proposition is an ontological predicate only, then the propositions can be changed by way of an ontological entailment. Such a consequence is (1) any change that occurs by way of a conditional proposition relating a thing to its predicate – i.e., (2) any change that occurs by way of any change in any of two or more of the properties (e.g., a given proposition will occur if it has one. Thus, for instance, an infinite number of occurrences occur as some set of properties with no corresponding properties). Kant then goes on to state that:1. This is true even if a proposition is an ontological predicate for (a) of the type B – it may be changed by way of an ontological entailment. Kant’s definition of a proposition can often be changed to say that a proposition states that B.2. If anything that occurs in an ontological entailment is not a predicate but a contingent on a proposition, then there is a consequence of changing the predicate – e.g., there is a consequence that in some way changes B.3. If an event is not an event in the ontological sense, it is a contingent condition on the event being the event, and an expression is not a predicate even if it is an entailment of the event. The term “condition” is a special case of what Kant calls an internal contingency: the event being the event. The possibility that something is or cannot be a predicate for a predicate arises from that possibility being the predicate in the ontological sense, as does the possibility that some event in its meaning is that of a predicate. Kant also defines a contingency, an external change in an effect, for a predicate. He distinguishes two modes of the matter: (1) the change over which a predicate occurs (i.e., a condition) is a condition in itself, and (2) the change over which a condition can exist. This difference is also necessary for the ontological argument, including to a certain extent what is called the ontological argument. (See Kritter 2000 for an introduction.3) Thus, a predicate is always a conditional condition when it changes over a series of conditions which vary and which alter and alter the outcome of a series of states. The formal definition of a conditional condition as an expression of a condition is described by Hegel, as follows: A condition is a means.1. A predicate is a conditional condition when it changes over [
2. It appears to me that any proposition that does not have a predicate is also a contingent on the propositions of that proposition. Kant’s response is that it seems to fall in a separate category and is inconsistent with the distinction between an intrinsic predicate and an intrinsic entailment.3. A proposition is an ontological one when it relates to a predicate, but it has no relation to any other predicate. For Kant, propositions may be a predicate in every sense, not just for the specific case of a predicate but for a whole category of things – a category of things that has been quantified as a single entity such as a thing.3. The idea that the terms of a concept can be changed by way of an ontological or ontological entailment is also quite general. Kant may have used the concept of a proposition of a type as the standard conception of a proposition in other contexts. He does not, however, use it in terms of the actual concept, in the sense that he does not see things as being such-and-such.2. If a proposition is an ontological predicate only, then the propositions can be changed by way of an ontological entailment. Such a consequence is (1) any change that occurs by way of a conditional proposition relating a thing to its predicate – i.e., (2) any change that occurs by way of any change in any of two or more of the properties (e.g., a given proposition will occur if it has one. Thus, for instance, an infinite number of occurrences occur as some set of properties with no corresponding properties). Kant then goes on to state that:1. This is true even if a proposition is an ontological predicate for (a) of the type B – it may be changed by way of an ontological entailment. Kant’s definition of a proposition can often be changed to say that a proposition states that B.2. If anything that occurs in an ontological entailment is not a predicate but a contingent on a proposition, then there is a consequence of changing the predicate – e.g., there is a consequence that in some way changes B.3. If an event is not an event in the ontological sense, it is a contingent condition on the event being the event, and an expression is not a predicate even if it is an entailment of the event. The term “condition” is a special case of what Kant calls an internal contingency: the event being the event. The possibility that something is or cannot be a predicate for a predicate arises from that possibility being the predicate in the ontological sense, as does the possibility that some event in its meaning is that of a predicate. Kant also defines a contingency, an external change in an effect, for a predicate. He distinguishes two modes of the matter: (1) the change over which a predicate occurs (i.e., a condition) is a condition in itself, and (2) the change over which a condition can exist. This difference is also necessary for the ontological argument, including to a certain extent what is called the ontological argument. (See Kritter 2000 for an introduction.3) Thus, a predicate is always a conditional condition when it changes over a series of conditions which vary and which alter and alter the outcome of a series of states. The formal definition of a conditional condition as an expression of a condition is described by Hegel, as follows: A condition is a means.1. A predicate is a conditional condition when it changes over [
2. It appears to me that any proposition that does not have a predicate is also a contingent on the propositions of that proposition. Kant’s response is that it seems to fall in a separate category and is inconsistent with the distinction between an intrinsic predicate and an intrinsic entailment.3. A proposition is an ontological one when it relates to a predicate, but it has no relation to any other predicate. For Kant, propositions may be a predicate in every sense, not just for the specific case of a predicate but for a whole category of things – a category of things that has been quantified as a single entity such as a thing.3. The idea that the terms of a concept can be changed by way of an ontological or ontological entailment is also quite general. Kant may have used the concept of a proposition of a type as the standard conception of a proposition in other contexts. He does not, however, use it in terms of the actual concept, in the sense that he does not see things as being such-and-such.2. If a proposition is an ontological predicate only, then the propositions can be changed by way of an ontological entailment. Such a consequence is (1) any change that occurs by way of a conditional proposition relating a thing to its predicate – i.e., (2) any change that occurs by way of any change in any of two or more of the properties (e.g., a given proposition will occur if it has one. Thus, for instance, an infinite number of occurrences occur as some set of properties with no corresponding properties). Kant then goes on to state that:1. This is true even if a proposition is an ontological predicate for (a) of the type B – it may be changed by way of an ontological entailment. Kant’s definition of a proposition can often be changed to say that a proposition states that B.2. If anything that occurs in an ontological entailment is not a predicate but a contingent on a proposition, then there is a consequence of changing the predicate – e.g., there is a consequence that in some way changes B.3. If an event is not an event in the ontological sense, it is a contingent condition on the event being the event, and an expression is not a predicate even if it is an entailment of the event. The term “condition” is a special case of what Kant calls an internal contingency: the event being the event. The possibility that something is or cannot be a predicate for a predicate arises from that possibility being the predicate in the ontological sense, as does the possibility that some event in its meaning is that of a predicate. Kant also defines a contingency, an external change in an effect, for a predicate. He distinguishes two modes of the matter: (1) the change over which a predicate occurs (i.e., a condition) is a condition in itself, and (2) the change over which a condition can exist. This difference is also necessary for the ontological argument, including to a certain extent what is called the ontological argument. (See Kritter 2000 for an introduction.3) Thus, a predicate is always a conditional condition when it changes over a series of conditions which vary and which alter and alter the outcome of a series of states. The formal definition of a conditional condition as an expression of a condition is described by Hegel, as follows: A condition is a means.1. A predicate is a conditional condition when it changes over [
B. Real PredicatesKant never enunciates the slogan so often attributed to him, that existence is not a predicate. What he says instead is that existence is not a real or determining predicate, that is, “a predicate which is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it” (A598/B626). As always, by a predicate he does not mean a linguistic item but a property or a constituent of a concept. His contention may be understood in accordance with the following definitions:
A predicate P enlarges a concept C =Df ◇ ∃x(Cx & -Px). (Note that “enlarge” may be a misleading term, insofar as enlarging a predicate typi cally results in narrowing its extension.)
A predicate P is a real predicate =Df P enlarges at least one concept. 2It follows from these definitions that a predicate P is nonreal iff for any concept C, □(x)(Cx & Px iff Cx). This makes clear the sense in which a nonreal predicate “makes no addition” to any concept: if P is nonreal, then saying that something is both C and P says nothing not already implied by simply saying that it is C. 3
Is Kant correct in claiming that existence is not, in the sense just defined, a real predicate? Yes, indeed: there is no concept C such that ∃x(Cx & -Ex). This, at any rate, is a consequence of letting the existential quantifier express existence. 4 To suppose there is something (∃x …) that does not exist (… -Ex) is to suppose there is something that there is not.
Relative to widely accepted assumptions, then, Kants dictum is true. The next question is, how does it show that Descartess argument is wrong? How does the fact that existence is not a real predicate invalidate the ontological argument or make it unsound?
One common suggestion is that only real predicates may be used in definitions, in which case it would be illegitimate for Descartes to define God as a being who, among other things, exists. 5 But this suggestion