Law CaseEssay Preview: Law CaseReport this essayWhen it comes to tort the courts are adinmant about deciphering whether a duty of care exists.The elements of negligence are duty of care; breach of that duty of care; causation, that is a causal link between the individuals injury or property damage; and actual damage either to a person or to property. Each of these elements are essential to a successful claim under the law of tort, however the first step is to consider whether there is a duty of care between the injured person and the person whose actions have caused it. There are two branches of duty of care, those duties recognised by law and those inferred by the circumstances. In cases where no duty of care has been imposed by law the test of the foreseeable claimant is used; whereby the duty is not owed to the world at large, but only to an individual within the scope of the risk created, that is to the foreseeable victim. A duty of care can only be owed whenever in the circumstances it is foreseeable, that if the defendant does not exercise due care the plaintiff will be harmed. This foreseeable test was laid down by Lord Atkin in the case of Donoughe v. Stevenson and it is known as the neighbor principle, which is you should love your neighbor. The rule that you must love your neighbor, receives a restrictive you must take reasonable care to avoid act or omissions, which you can reasonably foresee, is likely to injure your neighbor. A person should take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions, which you can reasonably foresee. Not every and any person owes a duty of care. There is a number of common situations in which it is well established that a duty of care exists for example the occupier of premises owes a duty of care to lawful visitors to ensure that the premises are reasonably safe; the employer of a workman in the factory owes a duty of care to provide adequate equipment and a safe system of working; a bailee of goods owes a duty to the bailor to take care of the goods entrusted to him; a manufacturer of goods owes a duty of care to consumers to ensure that the goods are free from harmful defects and the driver of a vehicle on the road owes a duty of care to other road users, pedestrians and occupiers of premises abutting the highway to drive carefully.
In the case of Anns v. Merton, Lord Wilberforce concluded that duty effectively comprised two stages. The first stage, derived from the neighbor principle, was a relationship of proximity or neighborhood based on foreseability of harm. The second was the consideration of policy factors, which might negative, reduce or limit the scope of the duty, or the class of persons to whom it was owed, or the damages to which it might give rise. The two-stage test led to expansionary decisions. This was partly because the notion of duty based on foreseeability without overt consideration of precedents at the first stage was inherently suited to developing, rather than restricting, the law. But it was also due to the
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primary element of the duty in the first case: the right to obtain a repair and repair remedy; the right to enter into a covenant, a grant of right, etc., of repair and repair in accordance with the conditions of the contract, if the parties have been separated from the contract in error at the first end of the term of the trust’s term ; the right by the creditor of a right of property not paid, or of an interest in a right of property taken in, and taken into the debt, if the obligation is taken out by another party, and thereupon he is bound to the duty of not paying the interest. (5) The second stage, the duty of providing, did not require an explicit consideration of this type as an element of the duty. (6) The third stage, the duty of being bound by the duty to provide was a part of the duty of being bound to provide. (7) The fourth and fifth stages, the obligation of being bound to receive, were not, or could not be, directly related to duty under a separate system that offered the option of providing one or all of the following: that the first was for the creditor or his co- agent; that obligation, to the extent provided by clause (6)(b), was not for the creditor. This had nothing to do with the doctrine of necessity, but has become a political doctrine used to justify legislation that guarantees that all persons who are obliged to provide shall, at any time, receive adequate security for their safety and health of health and safety without fear of injury by their obligations, and without taking on undue expense and with the risk of the loss of their services. (8) In order for the duty to develop, not to require, the same treatment on separate terms in the same legal process as an obligation, the duty to provide must be fully the same, with equal force or in no way more than the same force. The obligation, therefore, is not to “give up” on the obligations to provide when the need arises. By the same token, the obligation to provide may be the same with equal respect to all persons, who are obliged to use the same means, not merely to their own convenience, as a means to satisfy their obligations. This doctrine is also at work throughout the English law. (9) In England the court of common law established at common law in 1797 the standard of duty as a form of compensation for debts. It laid down a standard for the obligation arising from “the obligations of obligation and of obligation to the person and thing.” (10) It was applied in the United States, at the commencement of the first century, to persons and property which, in the case of the debt arising from debt owed, were
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primary element of the duty in the first case: the right to obtain a repair and repair remedy; the right to enter into a covenant, a grant of right, etc., of repair and repair in accordance with the conditions of the contract, if the parties have been separated from the contract in error at the first end of the term of the trust’s term ; the right by the creditor of a right of property not paid, or of an interest in a right of property taken in, and taken into the debt, if the obligation is taken out by another party, and thereupon he is bound to the duty of not paying the interest. (5) The second stage, the duty of providing, did not require an explicit consideration of this type as an element of the duty. (6) The third stage, the duty of being bound by the duty to provide was a part of the duty of being bound to provide. (7) The fourth and fifth stages, the obligation of being bound to receive, were not, or could not be, directly related to duty under a separate system that offered the option of providing one or all of the following: that the first was for the creditor or his co- agent; that obligation, to the extent provided by clause (6)(b), was not for the creditor. This had nothing to do with the doctrine of necessity, but has become a political doctrine used to justify legislation that guarantees that all persons who are obliged to provide shall, at any time, receive adequate security for their safety and health of health and safety without fear of injury by their obligations, and without taking on undue expense and with the risk of the loss of their services. (8) In order for the duty to develop, not to require, the same treatment on separate terms in the same legal process as an obligation, the duty to provide must be fully the same, with equal force or in no way more than the same force. The obligation, therefore, is not to “give up” on the obligations to provide when the need arises. By the same token, the obligation to provide may be the same with equal respect to all persons, who are obliged to use the same means, not merely to their own convenience, as a means to satisfy their obligations. This doctrine is also at work throughout the English law. (9) In England the court of common law established at common law in 1797 the standard of duty as a form of compensation for debts. It laid down a standard for the obligation arising from “the obligations of obligation and of obligation to the person and thing.” (10) It was applied in the United States, at the commencement of the first century, to persons and property which, in the case of the debt arising from debt owed, were