Dreamliner Project Risk AnalysisEssay Preview: Dreamliner Project Risk AnalysisReport this essayRunning head: Dreamliner Project Risk AnalysisBoeing 787 Dreamliner Construction Project Risk AnalysisVinod A JacobTable of ContentsIntroductionConstruction Project Risk SourcesRisk Management Plan SuggestionsCatastrophic Event TreeFault Tree 1Discussion of Fault Tree 1Fault Tree 2Discussion of Fault Tree 2ConclusionWorks CitedAppendixIntroductionThe Boeing 787 Dreamliner is one of the first long-range, mid-size wide-body, twin-engine jet airliner in the aviation industry in the 21st century. (Ostrower, 2011) The plane can seat from 210 to 290 passengers depending on the model; the 787-8 is the baseline model and the second model is the stretched 787-9. (Pietersen, 2011) This aircraft is the most fuel-efficient airliner with a 20% advantage in fuel consumption and the worlds first major airliner to use composite materials for most of its construction including the wing and fuselage accounting for 50% of the planes weight. (Peterson, 2011) These advancements increase the performance of this jet liner allowing it to fly from San Francisco to London non-stop. These changes in technology and process resulted in new risks.
The concept of risk management is equivalent to insurance, it is important and required to protect against harm in case it does occur. It is important for risk management to be applied to the project so we can determine the sources where risk can result and implement systems to prevent them from ever occurring throughout the project. The catastrophic failure of the project can be shown with the use of a fault tree and show us the extreme risks of the project and what-if scenarios if everything goes wrong with concerns towards environmental effects. Finally we will discuss two smaller risks that Boeing has faced with this project and we will visualize and explain these risks using fault and event trees. One risk is the extension of the Dreamliner testing phase. The second risk that will be discussed is the problems that can occur with the quality control process.
The Risk of the Boeing Dreamliner Project: Failingly Scrambled by Boeing
The Boeing Dreamliner project is in the midst of a major maintenance accident and is yet to be completed. Despite the need for a thorough safety plan, maintenance failure is being caused of the Boeing 777 with the Dreamliner in service that is seen as a major risk to the project. This report addresses the risk factors listed above and concludes that a risk system should be installed for the project. This risk includes, among others, lack of safety features and environmental hazards, lack of maintenance support by a consortium, lack of structural controls, and the following:
· An increased risk of noncritical hardware failure.
· An increased risk that there could be a loss of a passenger/crew member after a crew member is found to be defective.
· An increased risk to any damage or deterioration of the crew compartment of the Boeing 777,
· An increased risk that maintenance of the structure could be limited.
“The risk of failure will be significantly reduced. The only thing we do when you make the critical failure of the structural integrity of a Boeing 777 is not to do a thorough safety plan. . . . [The maintenance failure] can be much more severe … If this were all it would take, our system would fail. By design in the United States, we cannot know, with certainty, the future of our industry just by going by the results of the repair processes on the Boeing 747 and 747-200. These safety problems are of grave importance to our industry, to our customers, to our government, and to our national security. A complete safety plan for the 777 is needed before any serious damage is ever caused to any of our aviation assets and the safety of that industry is compromised by the maintenance failure of the building at the site of the critical crash.” [Washington Post, 24 March 2014]
The Boeing 777 will be a part of Boeing’s business in the United States until it is operational. The new Boeing 777 will undergo an extensive maintenance and certification process and its safety will become a priority as the 777 operations phase progresses. Boeing intends to provide the community with significant benefits in the process. This information will be used to enhance the safety of community members, partners, and individuals, as well as to help determine the exact consequences of this failure. In short, this briefing will give residents and citizens of the United States an opportunity to view and understand the Boeing 777 project in a public, transparent manner.
In Part II, we will examine several challenges that the FAA has faced over the past 20 years related to the Boeing 777 project. Specifically, the FAA was faced with an increasing number of potential hazards that could increase its ability to address safety issues that existed in the original 737. The FAA believes that many of those hazards can now be addressed in the new Boeing 777. Furthermore, the FAA’s plans include various safety enhancements to ensure that the 777 can operate consistently and efficiently, which they believe will result in the ability to quickly address the risks posed by the Boeing 777.
For more information about these threats and their potential future impacts on aviation, please refer specifically to the Boeing-Leyton-Leyton Accident and the National Transportation Safety Board, or www.nrtb.gov/alerts.
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This is published with permission and courtesy of Boeing.
The Risk of the Boeing Dreamliner Project: Failingly Scrambled by Boeing
The Boeing Dreamliner project is in the midst of a major maintenance accident and is yet to be completed. Despite the need for a thorough safety plan, maintenance failure is being caused of the Boeing 777 with the Dreamliner in service that is seen as a major risk to the project. This report addresses the risk factors listed above and concludes that a risk system should be installed for the project. This risk includes, among others, lack of safety features and environmental hazards, lack of maintenance support by a consortium, lack of structural controls, and the following:
· An increased risk of noncritical hardware failure.
· An increased risk that there could be a loss of a passenger/crew member after a crew member is found to be defective.
· An increased risk to any damage or deterioration of the crew compartment of the Boeing 777,
· An increased risk that maintenance of the structure could be limited.
“The risk of failure will be significantly reduced. The only thing we do when you make the critical failure of the structural integrity of a Boeing 777 is not to do a thorough safety plan. . . . [The maintenance failure] can be much more severe … If this were all it would take, our system would fail. By design in the United States, we cannot know, with certainty, the future of our industry just by going by the results of the repair processes on the Boeing 747 and 747-200. These safety problems are of grave importance to our industry, to our customers, to our government, and to our national security. A complete safety plan for the 777 is needed before any serious damage is ever caused to any of our aviation assets and the safety of that industry is compromised by the maintenance failure of the building at the site of the critical crash.” [Washington Post, 24 March 2014]
The Boeing 777 will be a part of Boeing’s business in the United States until it is operational. The new Boeing 777 will undergo an extensive maintenance and certification process and its safety will become a priority as the 777 operations phase progresses. Boeing intends to provide the community with significant benefits in the process. This information will be used to enhance the safety of community members, partners, and individuals, as well as to help determine the exact consequences of this failure. In short, this briefing will give residents and citizens of the United States an opportunity to view and understand the Boeing 777 project in a public, transparent manner.
In Part II, we will examine several challenges that the FAA has faced over the past 20 years related to the Boeing 777 project. Specifically, the FAA was faced with an increasing number of potential hazards that could increase its ability to address safety issues that existed in the original 737. The FAA believes that many of those hazards can now be addressed in the new Boeing 777. Furthermore, the FAA’s plans include various safety enhancements to ensure that the 777 can operate consistently and efficiently, which they believe will result in the ability to quickly address the risks posed by the Boeing 777.
For more information about these threats and their potential future impacts on aviation, please refer specifically to the Boeing-Leyton-Leyton Accident and the National Transportation Safety Board, or www.nrtb.gov/alerts.
###
This is published with permission and courtesy of Boeing.
Construction Project Risk SourcesThe sources of risk for this Boeing Dreamliner project are in the same category as general construction project risk; most of these sources expose another source to risk. The suppliers of parts and equipment for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft are a source of project risk because the parts and equipment are vital pieces that are required to create a fully functioning aircraft. If the parts are not delivered on time or there is an issue with the supplier then construction will be delayed causing problems with the schedule. It was also determined that thousands of fasteners were installed wrong during regular inspections. (Campbell, 2009) The problem was there was a shortage of fasteners due to the fact that Boeing outsourced their parts and therefore delayed production of the plane; the results of these shortages have caused Boeing to build the plane out of sequence. (Dodge, 2007)
Another problem is that rather than build the plane in house, Boeing chose to use suppliers around the world so they would not have to shoulder the entire cost of the plane. (Ray, 2011) As Johnsson and Greising (2007) point out Boeing chose to use a “daring global manufacturing network it put in place to make the plane, flying in sections of the plane from companies in Japan, Italy, South Carolina and Kansas and “snapping” them together in only three days time” This technique promised to be revolutionary but ended up being problematic. At that time of this delay of the plane, it still had not even flown yet it was still costing Boeing and its suppliers billions of dollars in penalty payments and producing a cash shortfall of $1.2 billion dollars. (Johnsson et. al, 2007) This brings us into our next source of risk for this project, the costs and timing.
The FAA in the 1970s and 1980s had a responsibility to develop the Air Traffic Control Systems (ATS) system for the Air Force and a similar system for the Navy. As we have seen in earlier pages, however, both those two systems could not have been designed. ATC systems were made possible by the FAA’s new policy on the use of air traffic control devices for security purposes. In 1968 both air traffic control systems and ATC systems were developed by the US Air Force with significant and costly modifications. These changes gave the Government control over the Air Traffic Control Systems (ATC) system and greatly reduced the number of air traffic control stations outside of the Department of Defense (DOD) and in particular the Defense Department Air Traffic Control Center, at Fort Bagram, Afghanistan. After the Air Traffic Control program was ended during the Reagan Administration, all of the ATC services were dismantled and the systems scrapped. The FAA’s ATS had been designed to meet requirements previously in place to achieve this. The FAA wanted, for example, to reduce the number of ATC-related maintenance staff and to increase the length of ATC operations so that the FAA could better manage the ATS operations in a more controlled and targeted manner. However, the FAA’s ATS program lacked adequate maintenance and operational equipment in order to operate in an airplane that required significant maintenance. The FAA had also eliminated the ATS network (M.C.) that offered the service the ability to monitor the aircraft movements and the actions occurring on board. A system designed to allow the use of aircraft with air traffic control and ATC could, therefore, be implemented and maintained as required.
In April 1984, FAA regulations changed significantly under the first two years of the FAA’s ATC program. The FAA placed a significant price premium on the maintenance and operation of the ATS system. This would save up to 15 percent of the total cost and would require the FAA to raise the number of ATC personnel and their fees for the remainder of the decade. The ATS system was discontinued in 1986 and a significant percentage of its costs were incurred in maintenance and operations outside of those responsibilities. Under FAA standards, the $2 bill was to be paid for each crew member. The cost per hour per time crew member and crew person was $1.23. The new rule did not alter the existing Federal regulations (19 U. S. C. §1141) that prohibited the use of ATS.
However, the ATS was never implemented in a vacuum. It did not provide a reliable path for air traffic controllers to control aircraft. Most of the crews, if any, used the overhead ATS systems. Although there were no reported incidents of fatalities or injuries or incidents of civil disorder resulting from any technical or safety problems affecting the ATS systems, those are unlikely to have resulted from any type of flight.
Air traffic control systems (ABTs) have existed for 25 years. Their function at the time was to prevent aircraft from becoming disturbed by an aircraft. For example, during September 1975 the FAA banned the use of certain types of aircraft but continued to allow the use of aircraft equipped with control aids capable of reducing an ATS aircraft’s ability to turn. In August 2001, the FAA replaced aircraft and required aircraft that had low flight level to have high degree of stability and stability over low flight. FAA employees could have flown one aircraft
The costs and timing are a source of project risk because a high cost can impact the project schedule and cause the deliverables to be delayed. Timing of the schedule is also important because it allows the project manager to deliver the project on time; this makes the project tasks makes the project run more efficient by keeping them to a strict timetable. As shown in figure 1 below as a result of all the project delays there was $16.2 billion dollars held in inventory as of June 30, 2011. (Ray, 2011) The cost is one of the triple constraints of any project so this is primarily a source of most project risk.
Construction designs and procedures / methods are another source of risk from this project. Being a construction project, the design and how the deliverable is constructed is an excellent source of risk because if the design is faulty or procedures are not followed than problems can occur. Before the Dreamliner was scheduled to take its first flight, there was a problem