Criminal Procedure Policy – Comparing and Contrasting of the Crime Control ModelsWhen comparing and contrasting of the crime control models, and due process and how they shape the criminal procedure policy it should be kept in mind that both models founded on Constitutional rights. These two models represent values that operate the criminal justice system. Due process and the control models also apply the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Bill of Rights to the criminal justice system.
The two models constructed in 1968 by Herbert Packer, a Stanford University law professor (Zalman, 2088). Crime control model and the due process model, two vales systems within the criminal procedure policy. The crime control model, is mostly reduction of crime, vindicate victims rights rather than protect defendants rights, more police power, the criminal justice system should operate like an assembly line, moving cases more swiftly. The accused presumed guilty and should be a discovery of truth or to establish the factual guilt in court. The due process model is more about individual liberties and rights. To provide due process or fairness under the law, more defendants rights not victims rights. Police power limited and authorities held accountable to regulations and procedures or guidelines. The criminal justice system should look more like an obstacle course, a series of procedural safeguards the protection of the innocence as of a conviction of guilt. Both models require value judgments, valid points one more conservative, principles, and polices of due process dominate in the criminal procedure policy and uphold individuals Constitutional rights (Zalman, 2008).
Regarding the Fourth Amendment, is part of the Bill of Rights that guard against unreasonable search and seizures supported by probable cause. In case Mapp v Ohio, in 1961 the Supreme Court the Fourth Amendment applies to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That evidence obtained by a violation of the Fourth Amendment, may not be used in criminal processes. Mapps home searched by several police officers who claimed to have a search warrant, but never produced one. An informant had given the officers information about Mapp a bombing suspect and gambling paraphernalia, which were never found. What was found was obscene material and Mapp convicted of possession of these materials (Cornell University Law School, 2007).
[Page 447 U. S. 1032-1033]
“In the case Mapp v Ohio, supra, the Due Process Clause bars the seizure of a person’s phone, tablet, or computer by a police officer or other security officer only if a warrant is served. In other words, even if no warrant is served, the search would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” ante, at 443 U. S. 14.
The Court of Appeals in Mapp found there was, in effect, a Fourth Amendment violation, but this Court did not reach that claim. That conclusion was the result of a legal analysis. It was the result of a jury’s finding that the person was being searched, but that the search was being conducted by a reasonable police officer. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 443 U. S. 14. In this case, there was a search conducted by the police officer, but it was of a person who was not in a police escort or at a different location. The search, based on a reasonable search of the person by law-enforcement officers that began with the initial finding that he was the suspect, was concluded in good faith.
In an express dissent in the lower court, Justice Clarence Thomas, in supporting this conviction (opinion from Chief Justice Roberts), noted that this case involved a Fourth Amendment violation when a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The Fourth Amendment in this position does not apply to searching for a prohibited product and selling a prohibited item. It applies solely to searches in which an officer does not possess probable cause to believe that person is involved, and such searches are justified under the Due Process Clause.
The Court of Appeals, in his dissent in Mapp v. Ohio, concluded:
“The majority’s insistence on an absolute right to search without a warrant, as well as that federal courts should be free to reject unreasonable searches based on Fourth Amendment rights, is not unique to this Court. See The Court of Appeals, supra, at 443 U. S. 21-22. In similar cases, when two different courts and no court have made similar statements on a question of Fourth Amendment content, there has been an inter-tribunal opinion to the contrary. The only thing that distinguishes this type of opinion from the First and Fourteenth Amendments is the Court’s understanding of the Fourth Amendment. The Court is aware that some federal courts have indicated that the Due Process Clause is the only constitutional guarantee against unconstitutional searches based on the Fourth Amendment, while recognizing that some states do not prohibit warrantless searches of “commencing information” that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But that proposition is clearly in conflict with the Framers’ views, and the Court held in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 443 U. S. 17, 24 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) that the Fourth Amendment guarantees an absolute right of search and seizure even where the law does not protect it for the purpose of