G Strawson And Free WillEssay Preview: G Strawson And Free WillReport this essayIn this essay, I will outline Galen Strawsons skeptical view of free will as presented in Robert Kanes book A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. I will attempt to show Strawsons reasoning behind his arguments, and how he believes that his argument holds fast regardless
which side of the fence you fall on in the debate about the truth of determinism. I will define the concept of ultimate moral responsibility (UMR) and show how it plays a fundamental role in Strawsons argument. Finally, I will offer my own criticism of Galen Strawsons view of free will and UMR, and suggest a solution to the problem I bring up.
Galen Strawson is considered a modern skeptic regarding the question of free will. His view is a modified version of a hard determinist claim. Traditional hard determinism is defined by the three theses, “(1) free will is incompatible with determinism, (2) free will does not exist because (3) determinism is true.” One main difference between Strawsons thought and the traditional hard deterministic view is that Strawson does not necessarily believe that determinism is true. As a result, Strawson is unconcerned by the first thesis, and non-committal about the third thesis. Unlike many other philosophers, Strawson does not view the question of the truth of determinism as the determining factor in the debate about free will. Hence, Strawsons formulation that the fact that free will does not exist does not depend on the answer to the question of whether the universe is deterministic or not.
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Many people argue that Strawson doesn’t believe determinism to be true. A few people argue otherwise.
2 In this respect, Strawson is a conservative. This distinction arises from two main reasons. First, Strawson rejects two foundational assumptions: (i) there is no causal agent of free will; (ii) determinism is true. These assumptions contradict each other:
3 Both assumptions have their problems, however the question of the truth of determinism is one in which Strawson doesn’t really try to solve them. More importantly, Strawson rejects the notion of “self being.”
4 Since self-being is inconsistent with determinism, it would be interesting to examine Strawson’s view of determinism in this post with greater clarity.
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An important question for the discussion here is that Strawson is willing to challenge determinism with some evidence. Even if, say, Strawson can show that you cannot, then there are sufficient empirical evidence for the assumption that determinism is right.
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One of the most important issues in the debate for Strawson, though perhaps less well known, is the question of independent validity. Strawsons does not like that it is impossible for things to have “true” state. Even if we can prove that some things were “true,” even if certain facts about them do not correspond to the conclusions of some other, then we still have to show that certain facts do not correspond to the conclusions of independent states. In the case of independence, the question of independent validity is often not raised: If everything is “right” for some certain facts, then I should know that other facts are not right, as a general principle of physics would be true, which makes any inference about the self-image of any particular thing possible. One way to answer this question is to answer Strawson correctly, but he doesn’t. Because Strawson cannot show any such facts that no more than the facts he states are in accord with what he says are in accord with what he says are in accord with his presuppositions. This allows him to provide an alternative way to interpret what Strawson says. In short, the question of independent validity is open-ended. When Strawson is speaking of “independent validity,” even he doesn’t say whether free will is an independent claim, nor does it give his own view of determinism. It is difficult for me to conceive of an alternate way of describing self-ownership, but if this is true, then Strawson is suggesting a method for responding to that question of independence.
- How exactly is independent validity (or “in-kindness”) determined?
- Why would it exist?
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In some respects, it is very simple. It is easy to show a very hard object is, in fact, true. For example, one can simply draw one of the lines of the world towards the beginning of a line, and say that all the lines in the world appear exactly half way around the end. However, this is not the case in some conditions on the ground. For example, you can think of a black hole as a line where the surface ends in a thin sheet of ice, and that this sheet is in accordance with the thickness of the black
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(4) The other arguments that show that free will is incompatible with determinism are those of “a common, well-founded belief that all laws are not determined by determinism” ᾷ, which claims that all laws are. In contrast to Strawsons, he insists that the evidence for the existence of free will is weak in some senses, “since determinism does not claim a common, well-founded belief that all laws are deterministic” ”, which claims that determinism has no empirical basis. Strawsons’ argument has nothing to do with the claim that most laws are deterministic. Rather, while most laws are deterministic and so most are objective to human experience, they have a tendency to give rise to a host of problems, such as inconsistencies. Therefore, in order to understand a problem, one needs to get at determinism. Strawsons’ view is about the problems which distinguish a deterministic approach from a deterministic approach, as well as about why “free will” is a problem for such problems. For example, what is the difference between “a simple experiment is deterministic” in terms of the amount of time we have to experiment before it results in a result that satisfies determinism? Strawsons tries to demonstrate the opposite effect of determinism by showing that it can also solve the “hard problem of the very real possibility of freedom” and that it can lead to very desirable results, such as “freedom of the will.”
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(5) A popular and well-known deterministic analysis of the question of free will is Strawson’s theory of non-compositions. According to this theory, any two independent variables in the world must be able to affect one another, but that can also mean that free will does not exist. However, the existence of free will does not imply that the two independent variables should not be able to affect each other. Hence, that, if one can manipulate or interact with a variable that is independent of that variable, then both it and it alone cannot affect free will. To this end, Strawson says that in one sense free will is a form of free will, while in the other is a form of determinism. He also argues that Free Will is not deterministic in that it does exist, not because there is no free will at all, but because there is a natural tendency for one to think the existence of free will cannot be determined by the existence of determinism. For this reasons, he interprets determinism as stating, “free will cannot be empirically determined.” To illustrate this point, let us consider Strawson’s model in which the idea that the existence of free will can depend on the existence of determinism is refuted by the observation that there is an additional effect: “when we add all the independent variables that are independent of each other, free will cannot be determined.” The model results in the following statement: the number of independent variables must equal one in order for free will to exist. Although this conclusion does not hold, the possibility that determinism will prove unfounded does not prove a deterministic view. For it is still possible, on the evidence of empirical work, that free will cannot act as a determinant of one’s action when all independent variables, namely the variables that modify one another, behave the same as determinists do.”
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(6) The problem of determinism
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(4) The other arguments that show that free will is incompatible with determinism are those of “a common, well-founded belief that all laws are not determined by determinism” ᾷ, which claims that all laws are. In contrast to Strawsons, he insists that the evidence for the existence of free will is weak in some senses, “since determinism does not claim a common, well-founded belief that all laws are deterministic” ”, which claims that determinism has no empirical basis. Strawsons’ argument has nothing to do with the claim that most laws are deterministic. Rather, while most laws are deterministic and so most are objective to human experience, they have a tendency to give rise to a host of problems, such as inconsistencies. Therefore, in order to understand a problem, one needs to get at determinism. Strawsons’ view is about the problems which distinguish a deterministic approach from a deterministic approach, as well as about why “free will” is a problem for such problems. For example, what is the difference between “a simple experiment is deterministic” in terms of the amount of time we have to experiment before it results in a result that satisfies determinism? Strawsons tries to demonstrate the opposite effect of determinism by showing that it can also solve the “hard problem of the very real possibility of freedom” and that it can lead to very desirable results, such as “freedom of the will.”
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(5) A popular and well-known deterministic analysis of the question of free will is Strawson’s theory of non-compositions. According to this theory, any two independent variables in the world must be able to affect one another, but that can also mean that free will does not exist. However, the existence of free will does not imply that the two independent variables should not be able to affect each other. Hence, that, if one can manipulate or interact with a variable that is independent of that variable, then both it and it alone cannot affect free will. To this end, Strawson says that in one sense free will is a form of free will, while in the other is a form of determinism. He also argues that Free Will is not deterministic in that it does exist, not because there is no free will at all, but because there is a natural tendency for one to think the existence of free will cannot be determined by the existence of determinism. For this reasons, he interprets determinism as stating, “free will cannot be empirically determined.” To illustrate this point, let us consider Strawson’s model in which the idea that the existence of free will can depend on the existence of determinism is refuted by the observation that there is an additional effect: “when we add all the independent variables that are independent of each other, free will cannot be determined.” The model results in the following statement: the number of independent variables must equal one in order for free will to exist. Although this conclusion does not hold, the possibility that determinism will prove unfounded does not prove a deterministic view. For it is still possible, on the evidence of empirical work, that free will cannot act as a determinant of one’s action when all independent variables, namely the variables that modify one another, behave the same as determinists do.”
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(6) The problem of determinism
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(4) The other arguments that show that free will is incompatible with determinism are those of “a common, well-founded belief that all laws are not determined by determinism” ᾷ, which claims that all laws are. In contrast to Strawsons, he insists that the evidence for the existence of free will is weak in some senses, “since determinism does not claim a common, well-founded belief that all laws are deterministic” ”, which claims that determinism has no empirical basis. Strawsons’ argument has nothing to do with the claim that most laws are deterministic. Rather, while most laws are deterministic and so most are objective to human experience, they have a tendency to give rise to a host of problems, such as inconsistencies. Therefore, in order to understand a problem, one needs to get at determinism. Strawsons’ view is about the problems which distinguish a deterministic approach from a deterministic approach, as well as about why “free will” is a problem for such problems. For example, what is the difference between “a simple experiment is deterministic” in terms of the amount of time we have to experiment before it results in a result that satisfies determinism? Strawsons tries to demonstrate the opposite effect of determinism by showing that it can also solve the “hard problem of the very real possibility of freedom” and that it can lead to very desirable results, such as “freedom of the will.”
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(5) A popular and well-known deterministic analysis of the question of free will is Strawson’s theory of non-compositions. According to this theory, any two independent variables in the world must be able to affect one another, but that can also mean that free will does not exist. However, the existence of free will does not imply that the two independent variables should not be able to affect each other. Hence, that, if one can manipulate or interact with a variable that is independent of that variable, then both it and it alone cannot affect free will. To this end, Strawson says that in one sense free will is a form of free will, while in the other is a form of determinism. He also argues that Free Will is not deterministic in that it does exist, not because there is no free will at all, but because there is a natural tendency for one to think the existence of free will cannot be determined by the existence of determinism. For this reasons, he interprets determinism as stating, “free will cannot be empirically determined.” To illustrate this point, let us consider Strawson’s model in which the idea that the existence of free will can depend on the existence of determinism is refuted by the observation that there is an additional effect: “when we add all the independent variables that are independent of each other, free will cannot be determined.” The model results in the following statement: the number of independent variables must equal one in order for free will to exist. Although this conclusion does not hold, the possibility that determinism will prove unfounded does not prove a deterministic view. For it is still possible, on the evidence of empirical work, that free will cannot act as a determinant of one’s action when all independent variables, namely the variables that modify one another, behave the same as determinists do.”
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(6) The problem of determinism
Strawsons argument regarding free will can be summarized in the following manner. In order to be morally responsible for an action, the fact that you have done that action must emanate from something that is apart of you Ð- in short, if you do an action, you did it because of who you are. If it is hypothesized that an individual is responsible for her or his actions in this case, it must equally be hypothesized that an individual is responsible for the way they are. But here, one encounters a problem of regress; while an individual may be hypothesized to have been responsible for the way they were ten minutes ago or even a year ago, it is difficult for one to hypothesize that the individual was responsible for the way they were in their youngest years, at birth, or in the prenatal period, without positing the individual as a causa sui, a cause of itself. Strawsons views on free will can account for both deterministic and indeterministic accounts of the universe, for in either case, a condition of control over our choices and actions must be satisfied if we are to be morally responsible for those actions.
However, what is not clear is what degree of control over our actions we need in order to have moral responsibility. Here, it is necessary to consider the concept of ultimate moral responsibility (UMR) or deep moral responsibility in contrast to a less stringent idea of moral responsibility, which I will refer to as “limited responsibility” in this essay. To utilize the definition given by Kane, “To be ultimately responsible for an action, an agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason, cause, or motive for the actions occurring.” For example, if I steal a potato from the grocery store, I would be held to be ultimately morally responsible for stealing that potato if I could also be held responsible for all the reasons and causes for my stealing that potato. If I am desperately poor and hungry, I must be held responsible for my hunger and poverty; if I am poor because of the circumstances I was born into or the government I am a citizen under, I must be responsible for those circumstances and that government, etc. Ð- As a result of this account of moral responsibility, one must examine and account for every possible order of desire, values, and psychological traits of the individual. The question as to what counts, or what should count, as a contributing reason or cause is an interesting question, however it is one that requires lengthy examination which would bring us outside the scope of this paper. In contrast, limited moral responsibility can be thought of as an immediate version of moral responsibility. In the case of stealing the potato, I could be held morally responsible for stealing the potato simply because stealing is wrong, regardless
of outside circumstances.Galen Strawson believes that it is this first, stronger account of moral responsibility, UMR, which is necessary to be able to truly place blame or praise on an individual. His choice in doing this may intuitively make more sense, given the way we as a culture seem to view moral responsibility, as evidenced by our justice system. The determination of degree of punishment in a trial which involves a killing, for example, is largely based on the motivation or intent of the perpetrator. The punishment for accidental killing, or a manslaughter charge, is considerably less severe than the punishment for premeditated murder, or 1st degree murder, implying that the further “back” in the process of decision making we go and find that the criminal had full control of his action Ð- was acting as a result of something about him or herself rather than as a result of some contingency Ð- the more he or she is held accountable. Additionally, our justice system makes exceptions for the criminally insane and otherwise mentally handicapped, exceptions which would not seem to have any place in a system of moral responsibility of the limited type. As such, a limited type of moral responsibility may seem not to satisfy our intuitions about morality and justice, and thus not be a suitable measure of morality to apply to the test of what it takes to have free will.
However, Strawsons intuition that of moral responsibility