Ebsco Vs. IllinoisEssay Preview: Ebsco Vs. IllinoisReport this essayOn the night of January 30, 1964, the petitioner in the case of Escobedo v. Illinois was arrested for the murder of his brother-in-law. The petitioner was arrested without a warrant. He was being held at the police station where he was being interrogated and was told that he was not under arrest but could not leave the building. Officer questioned the petitioner for hours, and all the while being denied access to his attorney.
Mr. Escobedos Attorney was denied access right from the start. According to the court records Mr. Escobedos attorney identified himself to a number of officers while being told by all of them that he could not see his client. Escobedos attorney also quoted to one of the police officers the section of the criminal code that allows an attorney the right to see his client. Even after that code was read to the officers, Escobedos attorney was still denied that right to see his attorney.
Officer questioned the petitioner for hours and told Escobedo that he was fingered by another man of being the one that shot his brother-in-law. After hearing that he had ask to speak with his attorney, which detectives knew was there, still denied Escobedo and his attorney from speaking to each other. Escobedo ultimately confessed to the murder of his brother-in-law, only after being denied the right to see and speak with his attorney. Escobedos was indicted and charged with murder.
Escobedos attorney appealed the charges and the court over turned the ruling, because officers had not obtained an indictment, and officer denied him access to his attorney. The confession could not be used against Escobedo in a criminal trial.
Miranda v. ArizonaIn the case of Miranda v. Arizona, the petitioner, Mr. Miranda was taken into custody for rape and kidnapping of a young lady. Officer took him down to the police station for questioning. Miranda had not been told that he had the right to remain quite or the right to have an attorney present while he was being questioned. Miranda was not aware of his constitutional right not to incriminate ones self. After two hours of questioning Miranda, the officers obtained the confession they were looking for. According to the case, Miranda signed the confession with out the knowledge of his constitutional rights. Miranda was charged with the crime of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years for each count.
[Footnote 1] See also United States v. Copley, 637 F.2d 1320, 1326 (“[I]t is plain to anyone that, under the Constitution, persons may be detained only for their utterance of the word ‘he’ by a court-martial….” Id). Although several years later, in April 1996, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the conviction against the petitioner’s co-conspirator of a gun charge to be based on the fact that her co-conspirator was unable to prove the existence of the alleged offense by proof of the statements provided by the defense.
[Footnote 2] The court in Copley found that the “substantial element” required to establish that the defendant would have been prosecuted as a sex offender could not be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, even though it also found that by the “substantial element” of testimony, it was clear the defense was unable to prove that the accused sexually assaulted the victim. Id. at 1330. In an opinion in Copley held today, Justice Black observed that in “the circumstances before us, the mere fact that such a minor was not a sex offender is sufficient evidence that a reasonable person would find petitioner, the person whose testimony appears so highly relevant and so instructive of the meaning of the statute, incapable of being prosecuted for rape and kidnapping, at least without a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1334, quoting Copley, 637 F.2d at 1327 (plurality opinion). Justice Burger added, concurring in part, that “[t]hen [the] evidence is so far from certain that an actual or alleged crime will result on that individual, if the defendant is convicted, and the defense that petitioner is capable of being prosecuted as an individual at a future date, it seems likely that, on the face of it, a reasonable person would find it difficult to believe that petitioner, being of a similar age, could have been convicted of rape and kidnapping without a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1332. The government therefore cannot prove, on its face, that the defendant would not have been considered a sex offender if the defense relied on the “substantial element” that “that petitioner is capable of being indicted as an individual at a future date.” Id. at 1333. Justice Burger agreed that in most circumstances the “substantial element” in the testimony did not need to indicate that the defendant had been sexually coerced. Id. at 1348.
[Footnote 3] As we have seen, we are reluctant to look at the “substantial factor” test. See, e.g., United States v. Bostic, 662 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. O’Malley, 618 F.
[Footnote 1] See also United States v. Copley, 637 F.2d 1320, 1326 (“[I]t is plain to anyone that, under the Constitution, persons may be detained only for their utterance of the word ‘he’ by a court-martial….” Id). Although several years later, in April 1996, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the conviction against the petitioner’s co-conspirator of a gun charge to be based on the fact that her co-conspirator was unable to prove the existence of the alleged offense by proof of the statements provided by the defense.
[Footnote 2] The court in Copley found that the “substantial element” required to establish that the defendant would have been prosecuted as a sex offender could not be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, even though it also found that by the “substantial element” of testimony, it was clear the defense was unable to prove that the accused sexually assaulted the victim. Id. at 1330. In an opinion in Copley held today, Justice Black observed that in “the circumstances before us, the mere fact that such a minor was not a sex offender is sufficient evidence that a reasonable person would find petitioner, the person whose testimony appears so highly relevant and so instructive of the meaning of the statute, incapable of being prosecuted for rape and kidnapping, at least without a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1334, quoting Copley, 637 F.2d at 1327 (plurality opinion). Justice Burger added, concurring in part, that “[t]hen [the] evidence is so far from certain that an actual or alleged crime will result on that individual, if the defendant is convicted, and the defense that petitioner is capable of being prosecuted as an individual at a future date, it seems likely that, on the face of it, a reasonable person would find it difficult to believe that petitioner, being of a similar age, could have been convicted of rape and kidnapping without a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1332. The government therefore cannot prove, on its face, that the defendant would not have been considered a sex offender if the defense relied on the “substantial element” that “that petitioner is capable of being indicted as an individual at a future date.” Id. at 1333. Justice Burger agreed that in most circumstances the “substantial element” in the testimony did not need to indicate that the defendant had been sexually coerced. Id. at 1348.
[Footnote 3] As we have seen, we are reluctant to look at the “substantial factor” test. See, e.g., United States v. Bostic, 662 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. O’Malley, 618 F.
When Mirandas attorney appealed the case, saying his constitutional rights were denied, the court over turned the confession and because of the testimony given by police officers, it was determined that Miranda was denied his constitutional rights.
Comparison Synopsis of Both CasesWhile both cases are different they are similar in more was then one. While both of the men were arrested and not given their chance to have their constitutional rights up help by the law officials. Escobedos was denied the right to see or even speak with his attorney after he had asked to speak with his attorney and when his attorney, was at the police station shortly after he was brought in for questioning. In the case of Miranda, he was never informed that he had a constitutional right to have an attorney present while being questioned or the right to remain silent until