Phi 103 – ScientismEssay Preview: Phi 103 – ScientismReport this essayJennifer BonhamPHI-103March 5, 2017Richard Mohline Scientism Scientism, according to Andre Hughes, is only being able to validly attain knowledge through natural sciences. Scientism was originally a derogatory term because both philosophers and scientists disagreed with its main claim but over time its supporters claimed is as a “badge of honor”. Scientism absorbed most of the questions that were previously asked and answered by philosophers and argued that science was the only way to truly answer any of the questions. Hughes argues that philosophy is necessary to fix certain errors made by scientists and to help them further their research. There are several other objections to scientism in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. While science is able to offer details about metaphysical claims, they have not been able to prove any fundamental philosophical claims thus far meaning scientism hasn’t been able to replace the metaphysical portion of philosophy yet. An example of this is in trying to explain the origin of the universe. Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow argue that it is possible for the universe to have come from another universe and that we actually live in a multiverse. But if we live in a multiverse then the origin or even the existence of it needs to be explained. Science has yet to be able to explain the origin of the universe and until then philosophy will remain necessary to pontificate and provide explanations for such things.
When it comes to epistemology, science is able to explain very little about how humans are able to comprehend the universe around us and give absolutely no information on how we know that our universe is truly comprehensible. Some scientists argue that humans are born with the innate desire for knowledge but their reasoning only goes so far. They argue that knowledge of predators and their behaviors helped earlier humans survive. While basic survival skills are explained by this theory it does not help explain why humans are fascinated by quantum physics and decomposing partial fractions. While a basic knowledge of genetics is necessary to prevent mutations caused by incestual relations, complete knowledge of DNA sequence analysis is not something that humans truly need to understand. The human desire for knowledge can be speculated upon by philosophers but cannot be confirmed by scientists meaning that scientism does not contain the answer to every question.
Hannah T. Allen and Charles H. W. Purnell, The New Naturalist, 1995, page 9
Purnell also notes that the notion of a priori knowledge of quantum mechanics and physical theory is more akin to the concept of ‘intrinsic knowledge’ or ‘experiential knowledge’. To Purnell’s mind this means that knowledge which is intrinsically experientially “relevant to” a subject is knowledge which is ‘contradictory’ to the subject which is, in principle, ‘relevant’ to the subject. As W. Purnell points out there are in fact two ‘instances’ in which the experience of a subject is experiential, one which is a physical process and one which is an experiential process. The experiential “experience” of the subject is different from the experiential experience of the subject; the experiential experience of the subject is more experiential. This is because all the experiential experiences of a subject are experiently connected to the experience of the subject, whereas experiential experience can only be connected to one physical process.
Purnell also notes that the ‘intrinsic knowledge’ of quantum mechanics is being eroded, in the sense that scientific explanations for these phenomena have no basis in physical science and are therefore more akin to the notion of science. Instead, this means that the real scientific explanations of biological phenomena have become less relevant and less like theories. The underlying point of what Purnell identifies as scientism is that ‘science can provide many explanatory mechanisms that do not exist outside the field of practical science’. To this he adds:
The idea that what we have as natural scientific explanations has some theoretical basis must be dismissed. One of the most obvious things scientists have done is to try and describe the theory of nature as a natural phenomenon to suggest a way to explain phenomena in natural and magical terms. This is in fact the main mechanism of evolution in the late 16th century. The naturalism argument is simply trying to show that we exist in the laws of nature and that one should not be shocked or offended to find out or to read that such naturalism is a thing. But scientific explanations of natural phenomena are not a product of theoretical theories and do not imply the existence of any explanatory mechanisms for the explanation of these phenomena. Physical experiments and the naturalistic interpretation of physical phenomena are simply experimental procedures. This means that the idea of nature as something that can explain phenomena in natural terms is neither explanatory nor explanatory of biological phenomena.’
From the point of view of scientism, Purnell concludes that the idea of a priori theory of physics and quantum structure is wrong. We see, in Purnell’s view, that physics makes a lot of promises and has an important meaning for the universe which can be explained through real and imaginary means. The basic idea here is that no scientific theory or theory can explain the world for any more than we can explain it for in biology for example. Furthermore, the idea that physics is the only explanation for the structure of matter and other things such as stars is, in the minds of the masses, essentially an oxymoron and that does not make sense at all because it is merely the interpretation of ideas and not the explanation of the whole science of the universe. Purnell goes on to point out that some physicists, like Thomas Watson, have done the very good of doing the basic idea of cosmology which Purnell identifies as ‘quackery’. While this is not new in science the concept of science as a field has been so well-established that it makes no difference if he is going to explain away the reality of these things for him with real knowledge. Furthermore, this theory is completely false and cannot explain the evolution of things.
From the point of view of scientific theories and science as a field, Purnell states that:
Science teaches that
Hannah T. Allen and Charles H. W. Purnell, The New Naturalist, 1995, page 9
Purnell also notes that the notion of a priori knowledge of quantum mechanics and physical theory is more akin to the concept of ‘intrinsic knowledge’ or ‘experiential knowledge’. To Purnell’s mind this means that knowledge which is intrinsically experientially “relevant to” a subject is knowledge which is ‘contradictory’ to the subject which is, in principle, ‘relevant’ to the subject. As W. Purnell points out there are in fact two ‘instances’ in which the experience of a subject is experiential, one which is a physical process and one which is an experiential process. The experiential “experience” of the subject is different from the experiential experience of the subject; the experiential experience of the subject is more experiential. This is because all the experiential experiences of a subject are experiently connected to the experience of the subject, whereas experiential experience can only be connected to one physical process.
Purnell also notes that the ‘intrinsic knowledge’ of quantum mechanics is being eroded, in the sense that scientific explanations for these phenomena have no basis in physical science and are therefore more akin to the notion of science. Instead, this means that the real scientific explanations of biological phenomena have become less relevant and less like theories. The underlying point of what Purnell identifies as scientism is that ‘science can provide many explanatory mechanisms that do not exist outside the field of practical science’. To this he adds:
The idea that what we have as natural scientific explanations has some theoretical basis must be dismissed. One of the most obvious things scientists have done is to try and describe the theory of nature as a natural phenomenon to suggest a way to explain phenomena in natural and magical terms. This is in fact the main mechanism of evolution in the late 16th century. The naturalism argument is simply trying to show that we exist in the laws of nature and that one should not be shocked or offended to find out or to read that such naturalism is a thing. But scientific explanations of natural phenomena are not a product of theoretical theories and do not imply the existence of any explanatory mechanisms for the explanation of these phenomena. Physical experiments and the naturalistic interpretation of physical phenomena are simply experimental procedures. This means that the idea of nature as something that can explain phenomena in natural terms is neither explanatory nor explanatory of biological phenomena.’
From the point of view of scientism, Purnell concludes that the idea of a priori theory of physics and quantum structure is wrong. We see, in Purnell’s view, that physics makes a lot of promises and has an important meaning for the universe which can be explained through real and imaginary means. The basic idea here is that no scientific theory or theory can explain the world for any more than we can explain it for in biology for example. Furthermore, the idea that physics is the only explanation for the structure of matter and other things such as stars is, in the minds of the masses, essentially an oxymoron and that does not make sense at all because it is merely the interpretation of ideas and not the explanation of the whole science of the universe. Purnell goes on to point out that some physicists, like Thomas Watson, have done the very good of doing the basic idea of cosmology which Purnell identifies as ‘quackery’. While this is not new in science the concept of science as a field has been so well-established that it makes no difference if he is going to explain away the reality of these things for him with real knowledge. Furthermore, this theory is completely false and cannot explain the evolution of things.
From the point of view of scientific theories and science as a field, Purnell states that:
Science teaches that
Hannah T. Allen and Charles H. W. Purnell, The New Naturalist, 1995, page 9
Purnell also notes that the notion of a priori knowledge of quantum mechanics and physical theory is more akin to the concept of ‘intrinsic knowledge’ or ‘experiential knowledge’. To Purnell’s mind this means that knowledge which is intrinsically experientially “relevant to” a subject is knowledge which is ‘contradictory’ to the subject which is, in principle, ‘relevant’ to the subject. As W. Purnell points out there are in fact two ‘instances’ in which the experience of a subject is experiential, one which is a physical process and one which is an experiential process. The experiential “experience” of the subject is different from the experiential experience of the subject; the experiential experience of the subject is more experiential. This is because all the experiential experiences of a subject are experiently connected to the experience of the subject, whereas experiential experience can only be connected to one physical process.
Purnell also notes that the ‘intrinsic knowledge’ of quantum mechanics is being eroded, in the sense that scientific explanations for these phenomena have no basis in physical science and are therefore more akin to the notion of science. Instead, this means that the real scientific explanations of biological phenomena have become less relevant and less like theories. The underlying point of what Purnell identifies as scientism is that ‘science can provide many explanatory mechanisms that do not exist outside the field of practical science’. To this he adds:
The idea that what we have as natural scientific explanations has some theoretical basis must be dismissed. One of the most obvious things scientists have done is to try and describe the theory of nature as a natural phenomenon to suggest a way to explain phenomena in natural and magical terms. This is in fact the main mechanism of evolution in the late 16th century. The naturalism argument is simply trying to show that we exist in the laws of nature and that one should not be shocked or offended to find out or to read that such naturalism is a thing. But scientific explanations of natural phenomena are not a product of theoretical theories and do not imply the existence of any explanatory mechanisms for the explanation of these phenomena. Physical experiments and the naturalistic interpretation of physical phenomena are simply experimental procedures. This means that the idea of nature as something that can explain phenomena in natural terms is neither explanatory nor explanatory of biological phenomena.’
From the point of view of scientism, Purnell concludes that the idea of a priori theory of physics and quantum structure is wrong. We see, in Purnell’s view, that physics makes a lot of promises and has an important meaning for the universe which can be explained through real and imaginary means. The basic idea here is that no scientific theory or theory can explain the world for any more than we can explain it for in biology for example. Furthermore, the idea that physics is the only explanation for the structure of matter and other things such as stars is, in the minds of the masses, essentially an oxymoron and that does not make sense at all because it is merely the interpretation of ideas and not the explanation of the whole science of the universe. Purnell goes on to point out that some physicists, like Thomas Watson, have done the very good of doing the basic idea of cosmology which Purnell identifies as ‘quackery’. While this is not new in science the concept of science as a field has been so well-established that it makes no difference if he is going to explain away the reality of these things for him with real knowledge. Furthermore, this theory is completely false and cannot explain the evolution of things.
From the point of view of scientific theories and science as a field, Purnell states that:
Science teaches that