Solution to the Problem of Induction (wittgensteinian Hinge Prop and Kantian Synthetic a Priori Account)
What is the most worrying formulation of the problem of induction? And the best response
I HAVE TWO HANDS. HINGE PROPOSITIONS ARE WHY I SHOULDNT THEM IN THE FIRE!
This account challenges Humes skepticism, arguing that both a hinge proposition and synthetic a priori account – which I argue is another form of hinge proposition – renders Humes skeptical objections ineffective, thus failing to undermine our use of inductive reasoning.
I argue initially for a hinge-proposition defense of induction, on the grounds that we cannot use deductive necessity as a criteria for justifying induction. Because deductive necessity, is a consequence of a series of sense impression and as such dependent upon induction. Humes doubts would thus implicitly asserts what the doubt intend to disprove.
This is however vulnerable to a Kantian objection that deductive necessity does not arise from a series of sense impressions but is a pre-structuring condition of experience, i.e. a synthetic a priori truth, which doesnt hinge upon induction, thus allowing deduction to be used to undermine inductive reasoning as circular and unjustified.
Whilst Quine raises objections against synthetic a prioris existence, I argue we may reasonably accept the existence of synthetic a prioris. Given this however; if we accept the synthetic a priori justification of deduction, I argue we must also accept that induction is also justified synthetic a priori. Synthetic a prioris, I then argue, are interchangeable with hinge propositions, given our inability to call them into question. Finally by considering Wittgenstein and Kants structure of justification, I argue that the best interpretation of synthetic a prioris is as hinge propositions given that they embody what it is to be a hinge proposition; our inability to call them into question. Both accounts show Induction to be exempt from skeptical doubt as it conditions our experience of the world and underlies the doubts and inquiries we can make.
The problem of induction:
As justifying induction on the grounds of previous experience is circular (in using the very principle it sets out to defend), Hume argues judgments about the future are problematic, as we are not justified in believing the conclusions of an inductive argument. The most worrying concern arising from Humes problem is the metaphysical problem; is induction justified? Which consequently leads into the epistemological question; how should we differentiate good from bad inductions?
Essentially Humes above claim that there is no necessary connection between inductive arguments and there conclusions, is not incorrect where necessary implies conformity with the